Israel’s decision to facilitate Qatar’s financial assistance to Gaza was made against the backdrop of international pressure to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in the Hamas-ruled territory. It was also based on a security calculation: Netanyahu and Israel’s security establishment believed that improving economic conditions, helping impoverished families, and preventing a humanitarian catastrophe could reduce tensions and avert another round of violence.
In February 2018, [then IDF Chief of Staff Gadi] Eisenkot, who is currently entrusted with forming a new government after Israel’s recent elections, reportedly warned the security cabinet that deteriorating humanitarian and economic conditions in the Gaza Strip could lead to another war and supported increasing assistance.
In January 2019, near the end of his term as head of the IDF, Eisenkot defended the Qatari money transfers, warning that without the funds, “the explosion will come sooner.”
His position illustrates that the policy was rooted in a broader security assessment shared by senior Israeli military officials, rather than being simply a personal political initiative by Netanyahu.
The policy was not a personal financial arrangement by Netanyahu to support Hamas. It was also not exclusive to his government. When they served as prime minister, both Naftali Bennett (in 2021-2022) and Yair Lapid (in 2022) continued to facilitate Qatari assistance.
The central calculation behind the policy was the assumption that Hamas, which controlled Gaza and was responsible for its civilian administration, would have less incentive to launch more attacks on Israel if Gaza’s population received financial assistance and basic services improved.
There is a distinction between authorizing humanitarian assistance and deliberately financing a terrorist organization’s military wing. It is also important to distinguish the intended purpose of a policy from its unintended consequences.
The October 7 massacre demonstrated the catastrophic failure of Israel’s widespread assumptions about Hamas: the belief that economic incentives and relative calm could contain the terrorist organization.
The central lesson, not just for Israel, is that humanitarian aid must never become an instrument that allows a terrorist organization to consolidate its rule, evade responsibility for the civilian population, or divert resources toward preparing another war.
Helping impoverished Palestinian families was a legitimate humanitarian objective. Israel believed that doing so could prevent another round of violence. That this calculation proved disastrously mistaken does not establish that Netanyahu’s intention was to finance Hamas’s military machine.
Those accusing Netanyahu should address the entire historical record, including the continuation of the same policy under his political rivals – Bennett, Lapid and Gantz – rather than to portray the Qatari payments as a project conceived and implemented by Netanyahu alone. He had plenty of company: most of Israel.
Since the Hamas-led October 7, 2023 massacre, one of the accusations repeatedly leveled against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is that he “helped” to finance Hamas by allowing Qatar to transfer millions of dollars into the Gaza Strip. His critics claim, falsely, that Netanyahu effectively strengthened the terrorist organization that eventually launched the deadliest attack in Israel’s history.
This accusation, however, leaves out important elements of the events. Israel’s decision to facilitate Qatar’s financial assistance to Gaza was made against the backdrop of international pressure to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in the Hamas-ruled territory.
It was also based on a security calculation: Netanyahu and Israel’s security establishment believed that improving economic conditions, helping impoverished families, and preventing a humanitarian catastrophe could reduce tensions and avert another round of violence.
Netanyahu was not alone in holding this view. Gadi Eisenkot, who served as IDF Chief of Staff from 2015 to 2019, also advocated easing restrictions and providing economic assistance to Gaza. In February 2018, Eisenkot, who is currently entrusted with forming a new government after Israel’s recent elections, reportedly warned the security cabinet that deteriorating humanitarian and economic conditions in the Gaza Strip could lead to another war and supported increasing assistance. In November 2018, he argued in favor of delivering humanitarian relief despite opposition from then-Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman.
In January 2019, near the end of his term as head of the IDF, Eisenkot defended the Qatari money transfers, warning that without the funds, “the explosion will come sooner.”
His position illustrates that the policy was rooted in a broader security assessment shared by senior Israeli military officials, rather than being simply a personal political initiative by Netanyahu.
On the eve of last month’s elections, nevertheless, Eisenkot accused Netanyahu of possible “treason” over the Qatari payments to Gaza.
The policy was not a personal financial arrangement by Netanyahu to support Hamas. It was also not exclusive to his government. When they served as prime minister, both Naftali Bennett (in 2021-2022) and Yair Lapid (in 2022) continued to facilitate Qatari assistance.
This does not mean that Hamas did not benefit from the arrangement. It does mean, however, that the political debate should reflect the full history and the actions of all the political players.
Qatar began providing substantial assistance to Gaza after Hamas forcibly seized control of the territory in 2007, when Ehud Olmert was prime minister. The arrangements became particularly significant in 2018, when the Palestinian Authority (PA), headed by Mahmoud Abbas, reduced financial support for Gaza and tensions along the Israeli border intensified.
By then, Israel was facing growing international pressure to ease restrictions and help prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in the Gaza Strip.
International organizations and foreign governments were demanding that services be maintained and that assistance reach civilians. Israel was also concerned that the deteriorating economic situation, unemployment, electricity shortages, and lack of basic services could lead to further instability and violence.
In November 2018, Israel permitted the transfer of $15 million in Qatari cash into Gaza. The money was part of a larger assistance program intended to pay salaries, support impoverished families, and address the deteriorating humanitarian situation.
The Israeli government, saying that it had been coordinated with security experts to restore calm to Israeli communities in the south and prevent a humanitarian disaster in Gaza, defended the decision at the time.
The central calculation behind the policy was the assumption that Hamas, which controlled Gaza and was responsible for its civilian administration, would have less incentive to launch more attacks on Israel if Gaza’s population received financial assistance and basic services improved.
The financial assistance eventually covered several categories: monthly stipends for needy Gazan families, fuel for Gaza’s electricity plant, humanitarian and infrastructure projects, and salaries for some employees of the civilian administration. These categories should not be confused. Money intended for impoverished families was not the same as money designated for civil servants, and neither category was officially intended to finance Hamas’s military wing.
Perhaps the most important item for those accusing Netanyahu of pursuing a policy designed exclusively to strengthen Hamas is what happened after he left office in 2021.
In June 2021, Naftali Bennett replaced Netanyahu as prime minister. Bennett had previously criticized the practice of bringing suitcases filled with Qatari cash into Gaza. Yet his government did not terminate Qatari assistance. Instead, it introduced a different mechanism for distributing the money.
In August 2021, Qatar and the United Nations announced an agreement under which approximately 100,000 impoverished Gazan families would receive $100 each month. The $10 million monthly program was to be administered through the United Nations and the World Food Program, with funds transferred through banks and distributed using reloadable debit cards.
Israel’s then Defense Minister Benny Gantz, another political rival of Netanyahu, welcomed the arrangement. He said the new mechanism would ensure that the money reached those in need while maintaining Israel’s security requirements.
The assistance continued under Bennett and subsequently under Lapid, who became prime minister in July 2022.
In November 2021, Qatar and Egypt also agreed on another mechanism, with Israel’s tacit approval: to resume assistance toward the salaries of Gaza civil servants. Both Bennett and Lapid continued the policy of facilitating Qatari financial assistance to Gaza, despite changing how the funds were distributed.
There is a distinction between authorizing humanitarian assistance and deliberately financing a terrorist organization’s military wing. It is also important to distinguish the intended purpose of a policy from its unintended consequences.
The October 7 massacre demonstrated the catastrophic failure of Israel’s widespread assumptions about Hamas: the belief that economic incentives and relative calm could contain the terrorist organization.
The central lesson, not just for Israel, is that humanitarian aid must never become an instrument that allows a terrorist organization to consolidate its rule, evade responsibility for the civilian population, or divert resources toward preparing another war.
Helping impoverished Palestinian families was a legitimate humanitarian objective. Israel believed that doing so could prevent another round of violence. That this calculation proved disastrously mistaken does not establish that Netanyahu’s intention was to finance Hamas’s military machine.
Those accusing Netanyahu should address the entire historical record, including the continuation of the same policy under his political rivals – Bennett, Lapid and Gantz – rather than to portray the Qatari payments as a project conceived and implemented by Netanyahu alone. He had plenty of company: most of Israel.
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