The brutal gang rape of a woman by three Afghan asylum seekers in central Vienna on April 22 has shocked the Austrian public and drawn attention to a spike in migrant-related rapes, sexual assaults and other crimes across the country.

The migrant crime wave comes as the anti-immigrant Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) has surged in opinion polls. The party’s candidate, Norbert Hofer, won the first round of Austria’s presidential elections on April 24, and is on track to win the presidency in the second round, run-off election scheduled for May 22.

The three Afghans — two 16-year-olds and one 17-year-old — followed the woman, a 21-year-old exchange student, into a public restroom at the Praterstern train station, one of the main transportation hubs in Vienna. One of the migrants held the woman down while the other two took turns raping her.

A passerby called the police after she heard the woman screaming. By the time police arrived, the men had gone. The suspects, who were arrested as they were attempting to flee the station, do not speak German. Through an interpreter, the migrants told police they were drunk and do not remember carrying out the crime.

If convicted, they face a maximum sentence of seven-and-a-half years in prison. Due to the lenient nature of the Austrian judicial system, however, they may end up spending only two years behind bars, according to local observers.

It is also unlikely that the migrants will be deported: according to European law, sending them back to Afghanistan would be a violation of their human rights. Instead, observers say, the Afghans will qualify for Austrian social welfare benefits — €830 ($950) per month plus free healthcare — and probably for the rest of their lives become wards of Austrian state.

The assault in Praterstern is one of a growing number of migrant sex crimes in Austria (other migrant rapes and sexual assaults are included in the appendix below):

• A 20-year-old asylum seeker from Iraq confessed to raping a 10-year-old boy at a public swimming pool in Vienna. The Iraqi said the rape was a “sexual emergency” resulting from “excess sexual energy.” The man, who left his wife and child behind in Iraq, said he had been unable to control his libido because he had not had sexual relations since arriving in Austria in September.
• An 18-year-old asylum seeker from Afghanistan was sentenced to 20 months in prison for raping a 72-year-old woman in Traiskirchen. “First he beat the woman black and blue, then he raped her, and then he took her underwear as a trophy,” local police said. In addition to a lenient sentence, the man will be allowed to remain in Austria and, after he leaves prison, collect social welfare benefits.
• A 20-year-old asylum seeker from Afghanistan was arrested after he coerced 13-year-old girl from the town of Korneuburg repeatedly to have sex with him. The man, who was living in an asylum shelter in Hollabrunn, first established contact with the girl over the Internet. Each time they met in person, he verbally threatened her until she agreed to have sex. The man was arrested after the girl told her parents about the relationship, which had been going on for more than three months.
• Mobs of Arab migrants sexually assaulted dozens of women in Vienna, Salzburg and Innsbruck on New Year’s Eve. The sex attacks, known in Arabic as taharrush (“harassment”), were similar to those carried out that day by North African migrants in Cologne, Germany and other cities. Police initially denied that the attacks had taken place, but later admitted to lying, purportedly to protect the privacy of the victims.

Those who dare to link spiraling crime to Muslim mass migration are being silenced by the guardians of Austrian multiculturalism.

In April, for example, the Austrian Press Council (Presserat) — a group that enforces a politically correct “code of ethics” to ensure that Austrian media outlets toe the line of state-sanctioned multiculturalism — censured the left-leaning magazine, Falter, for “blanket discrimination” against Muslims.

The magazine’s editors — otherwise faithful proponents of European multiculturalism — appear to have had enough of migrants raping their way through Europe with virtual impunity. For the January-February 2016 edition, Falter’s cover featured a black and white drawing of five “light skinned” European women surrounded by large numbers of “dark skinned” Arab males. The image evoked images of the taharrush assaults in Cologne.

In a three-page “decision,” the Presserat ruled that the image violates the “code of ethics” because it amounts to “blanket slander and discrimination” against Arab men:

“The men are all portrayed with the same fierce-looking facial expression, dark hair and noticeably dark eyebrows. In this way — in the context of the attacks in Cologne — the artist is constructing a prototype of men from North Africa, i.e., the Arab world. The uniformity of the image suggests that, rather than portraying individuals, it depicts a homogenous group whose members all behave in the same way.

“Therefore, readers could be left with the impression that the sexual assaults in Cologne were not the acts of individual persons or person groups, but that such conduct is typical for men from North Africa, i.e., the Arab world. The image could leave the impression that all North Africa men who are here in Europe fail to conduct themselves correctly vis-à-vis women.”

The editors of Falter defended themselves against accusations of racism:

“The fact is that North Africans were overwhelmingly responsible for the assaults in Cologne. This is what took place and we should be allowed to represent it as such.”

Vienna is the epicenter of migrant crime in Austria. According to data compiled by the Austrian Interior Ministry, nearly one out of three asylum seekers in Vienna was accused of crimes in 2015. Of the nearly 21,000 officially approved asylum seekers in the capital, 6,503 were known to have committed crimes in 2015, a jump of nearly 50% over 2014. The data shows that 2,270 of the criminals were under the age of 20, a 72% jump over 2014. Seven were under age nine, while 31 were under age 13.

According to Vienna Police Chief Gerhard Pürstl, North African gangs fighting for control over drug trafficking were responsible for roughly half of the 15,828 violent crimes — rapes, robberies, stabbings and assaults — reported in the city during 2015.

The area around the Praterstern station, where the exchange student was raped, has become overrun by shiftless migrants from Afghanistan and North Africa who are selling drugs, fighting turf battles and assaulting female passersby. Police were dispatched to the area a total of 6,265 times in 2015, or an average of 17 times a day, according to local media. But local authorities appear unable or unwilling to restore order to the area.

The area around Praterstern train station in Vienna is overrun by shiftless migrants from Afghanistan and North Africa who are selling drugs, fighting turf battles and assaulting female passersby. Police were dispatched to the area 6,265 times in 2015.

The head of the Austrian Police Union, Hermann Greylinger, estimates that Vienna needs around 1,200 more police officers in order to establish order in the capital:

“If we are allowing in our country 111,000 migrants, few of whom have had background checks, then clearly the police must be massively increased. Almost all asylum claimants are moving to Vienna. We now have more migrants than the population of the city of Salzburg, the fourth-largest city in Austria.”

Austria’s migrant crime problem is being exacerbated by an extremely lenient criminal justice system. On May 4, for example, a 21-year-old migrant from Kenya randomly killed a 54-year-old woman on a busy street in Vienna by hitting her over the head with an iron bar. It soon emerged that the Kenyan was well known to city police: since arriving in Austria in 2008, he had committed at least 18 previous crimes — including dealing drugs, attacking police officers and hitting someone over the head with an iron bar — but he has repeatedly been set free.

Given the growing insecurity, it comes as no surprise that Austrian voters are looking for a change in political direction.

In what amounts to a political earthquake, Freedom Party (FPÖ) candidate Norbert Hofer won 36% of the vote in the first round of Austria’s presidential election on April 24. Hofer — who has campaigned on a platform calling for strict limits on immigration and tough rules for asylum seekers — defeated all of the other candidates, including those from the two governing parties, the Social Democrats and the Austrian People’s Party, which have dominated Austrian politics since the end of World War II.

Hofer, who says that as president he will be the “protector of Austria,” is now on track to defeat the Green Party’s Alexander Van der Bellen, a 72-year-old economist who is opposed to limits on immigration, in a run-off ballot to be held on May 22.

Hofer’s meteoric rise is focusing the minds of the establishment parties. On April 27, just three days after Hofer’s electoral victory, the Austrian Parliament adopted what may be one of the toughest asylum laws in Europe.

Under the new law, Austria will declare a “state of emergency” on the migration crisis. This will allow Austrian authorities to assess asylum claims directly at the border. Only asylum seekers with immediate family members already in Austria, or those who can prove they are in danger in neighboring transit countries, will be allowed to enter the country. Other migrants will be turned away. The new law also limits any successful asylum claim to three years.

Interior Minister Wolfgang Sobotka said the new law is needed to stem the flow of migrants and refugees: “We cannot shoulder the whole world’s burden.”

Austria received 90,000 asylum requests in 2015, the second-highest number in the European Union on a per capita basis, but this pales in comparison to what may lie ahead. In a radio interview on April 28, Sobotka warned that up to one million migrants are poised to cross the Mediterranean Sea from Libya to Europe.

Soeren Kern is a Senior Fellow at the New York-based Gatestone Institute. He is also Senior Fellow for European Politics at the Madrid-based Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos / Strategic Studies Group. Follow him on Facebook and on Twitter. His first book, Global Fire, will be out in 2016.

Appendix

Sexual Assaults and Rapes by Migrants in Austria, January-April 2016.

Gatestone Institute has reported about the migrant rape epidemic in Germany and Sweden. The problem has now spread to Austria. Following are a few cases from the first four months of 2016:

April 29. A 35-year-old migrant from Algeria attempted to rape a woman at a bus stop in Linz. The man beat the woman unconscious, but not before she broke his nose. He was arrested after he went to a local hospital seeking medical attention. It later emerged that the Algerian has a long criminal record, including other attempted rapes, but cannot be deported because Algeria will not take him back.

On April 25, Kronen Zeitung, the largest newspaper in Austria, reported that an “Arabic-looking man” attempted to rape a 27-year-old woman at a bus stop in Vienna. “All he could say was sex, sex, sex,” the woman said. The man pulled a condom out of his pants pocket and then dropped his trousers. “I screamed as loud as I could,” the woman said, “until the man ran away.” She said that city police have been wholly uninterested in her case: “They have not even asked me for my name.” After local media reported on her case, police issued an apology and blamed their failure to take her seriously on a “regrettable misunderstanding.”

April 24. An unidentified migrant raped a 19-year-old woman in Eisenstadt.

April 22. Three asylum seekers from Afghanistan gang-raped a 21-year-old woman at a train station in Vienna.

April 22. A 17-year-old asylum seeker from Afghanistan attempted to rape a 20-year-old woman in Graz.

April 21. A 17-year-old asylum seeker from Afghanistan sexually assaulted a 19-year-old woman on a train in Grieskirchen. The train’s conductor intervened after he heard the woman scream. The Afghan told police that the woman was lying and demanded an apology.

April 20. Two North African migrants sexually assaulted a woman in front of the main train station in Salzburg. When a 26-year-old passerby attempted to intervene, the migrants punched and kicked him so hard that he was rushed to a nearby hospital. One of the attackers is a 31-year-old asylum seeker from Morocco. The other suspect remains at large.

April 15. A 42-year-old migrant from Slovenia was arrested for attempting to sexually assault two 18-year-old women in Leibnitz.

April 13. An “Arab looking” man sexually assaulted three women at a bus stop in Vienna.

March 24. Two Afghan migrants were arrested for raping a 20-year-old woman in Wels.

March 21. A migrant from North Africa assaulted a 27-year-old woman on a packed subway train in Vienna. The man began touching the woman on her hands. When she got up to find another seat, the man grabbed her and began kissing her on the mouth. Police told the woman there was nothing they could do because kissing does not qualify as sexual assault.

March 12. A 16-year-old asylum seeker from Libya attempted to kidnap and rape two women in Vienna. After the three met on a subway train, the Libyan promised to take the women to a nightclub. He took them instead to an apartment where he attempted to lock the women in the basement and rape them. One of the women escaped and called the police.

March 8. A 20-year-old asylum seeker from Afghanistan was observed pointing to his genitals in front of a seven-year-old girl at a public swimming pool in Vienna. The pool director and a swimming instructor held the man until police arrived. The police let him go.

March 6. A “foreign looking” man sexually assaulted a 37-year-old woman at a public swimming pool in Klagenfurt after she intervened to prevent him from molesting her four-year-old boy.

February 25. A “southerner” sexually assaulted two teenage girls at a shopping mall in Innsbruck.

February 22. An 18-year-old migrant from Afghanistan was arrested for raping a 52-year-old woman in Innsbruck.

February 14. Six migrants sexually assaulted a 49-year-old woman on a subway in Vienna. Two of the men, an 18-year-old asylum seeker from Afghanistan and a 23-year-old asylum seeker from Iraq, were arrested as they tried to exit the station. The other four remain at large.

February 11. A 33-year-old migrant from Iran masturbated in front of female patrons at a public swimming pool in Linz.

February 8. A 22-year-old migrant from Macedonia identified only as Ibrahim J. was arrested in Vienna for sexually assaulting more than 20 women in Vienna and other parts of Austria. Among other crimes, the man is accused of raping a 15-year-old girl.

February 6. A group of 28 male asylum seekers sexually harassed female patrons at an outdoor ice skating rink in Stockerau. The migrants then attacked security guards who tried to intervene. Police were needed to restore order.

February 4. Six “southerners” assaulted a 53-year-old woman in front of a grocery store in Spittal after she refused to give them money.

February 3. Three migrants sexually assaulted a 16-year-old girl at a streetcar stop in Leonding. One of the men held the girl down while the other two took turns assaulting her.

January 26. A 24-year-old asylum seeker from Gambia raped and murdered a 25-year-old American woman in Vienna. The woman from Colorado, who was working as an au pair (nanny), had given the man, Abdou I., shelter in her apartment. He had fled his asylum shelter because his asylum request was denied and he feared being deported. After the murder, the man fled to Switzerland, where he was arrested after police traced his cellphone. It later emerged that he was wanted in Germany for sexually assaulting an underage girl.

January 23. A migrant from Macedonia attempted to rape a 21-year-old woman in Vienna. The man made eye contact with the woman on a subway and followed her after she got off the train.

January 16. A 21-year-old asylum seeker from Afghanistan raped an 18-year-old woman at the Prater, a large public park in Vienna.

January 10. A 29-year-old asylum seeker from Afghanistan tried to molest a six-year-old boy at a public swimming pool in Linz. The mother of the child said: “I noticed six migrants enter the building. Two of them sat down at the edge of the pool for children. One of them began stimulating his genitals while flirting with my youngest child.”

January 1. Mobs of Arab men sexually assaulted at least 24 women in Vienna, Salzburg and Innsbruck.

Despite a deal with the European Union that promised stricter regulations on migrants traveling from Turkey to the EU, Turkey is doing little to prevent them from entering Europe. Turkey has also not done much to care for those stranded within their borders.

This was expected to change last year after a mini-summit led by German Chancellor Angela Merkel on November 29 in Brussels, to discuss closer cooperation between the EU and Turkey. Both the parties agreed to three main points: to limit the number of refugees leaving Turkey for the EU; to establish a bilateral readmission process, and to accept migrants expelled from the EU. In return Turkey would receive three billion euros from the EU and the US to aid refugees — especially the 2.2 million Syrians now living in Turkey. Additionally, EU member-states would allow visa-free entry for citizens of Turkey.

After the summit, French President François Hollande told reporters, “As Turkey is making an effort to take in refugees — who will not come to Europe — it’s reasonable that Turkey receive help from Europe to accommodate those refugees.”

Former Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu told reporters, “Today is a historic day in our accession process to the EU. With EU leaders today we will be sharing the destiny of our continent, global challenges of the economic crisis as well as regional geopolitical challenges in front of us including migration issues.”

The proposed deal seemed to anticipate that the Turks would control the Aegean border with the Greek islands to stop the flow of migrants there, and crack down on the smuggling rings running the trade. In practice, however, the flow of migrants has not been stopped, and the conditions for migrants in Turkey are not what was hoped for. There is no sign that there will be any serious steps taken against the smugglers operating inside Turkey.

Greek president Prokopis Pavlopoulos recently expressed his concern by saying, “I have a strong fear that Turkey’s smugglers have the support of the authorities, who act like they have seen nothing. … There are even cases where the smugglers are helped. We have evidence.”

Migrants set sail on an inflatable boat from Turkey to the Greek island of Lesbos, August 25, 2015. (Image source: Reuters video screenshot)

The circumstances in which the refugees are living also remain unsatisfactory despite the considerable sum Turkey received to improve the migrants’ quality of life. One report states that,

“Temporary protection does not grant refugees permission to work and to qualify for temporary protection, all refugees must live in ‘satellite towns’ outside the main, cosmopolitan cities such as Istanbul. They must submit to controls and conditions and report once a week to the satellite cities they are allocated to. They do not receive any state support for accommodation or daily expenses so, without independent means, refugees are pushed towards living and working illegally.”

The conditions for migrants in Turkey are provoking them to leave and risk their lives in a quest for safety in Greece. Human Rights Watch, in its 2016 report, wrote,

“A lack of effective protection in Turkey for Syrians and others, existing border restrictions with Syria imposed by Turkey, and Turkey’s record of police abuse gave rise to concerns that the deal could deny people access to asylum, trap people in Syria, and lead to police abuse and detention of asylum seekers who try to travel to the Europe.”

Greece is at the receiving end of the migrants across the sea. If Turkey does not control the migrant flow, there is little that Greece can do once the refugees have arrived in its borders. In an interview with Deutsche Welle, Greek Migration Policy Minister Yiannis Mouzalas said, “Smuggling networks are still in full operation… The deportation of migrants who have traveled from Turkey is also a big problem.”

Although purportedly Turkey is a secular state, 99.8% of its people are officially registered as Muslim, mostly Sunni. Terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (ISIS), Al Nusra and Al-Qaeda come from the same sect of Islam. Some people believe that many Turkish officials sympathize with Sunni terrorist groups such as ISIS and that perhaps this partiality has an effect on their handling of the refugee crisis.

In 2014, amateur video footage appeared revealing Islamic State terrorists chatting with a group of Turkish border guards near the besieged Syrian city of Kobane. A report says, “The amateur footage, understood to have been filmed close to Zarova Hill in the outskirts of Kobane, raises serious questions about the apparently relaxed relationship between the terror group and officials from the Nato member state.” This raises concerns about the future of negotiations between Turkey and the EU.

Turkey, after the attempted coup in July, is expected to become increasingly Islamist. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, after he finishes purging thousands of those he seems to regard as opponents, appears to be reaching for powers that are strictly Islamist, as well as totalitarian — possibly “Sultan for Life.” Already, homosexual conduct is punishable by imprisonment.

It is doubtful that Turkey will hold up its end of the EU migrant deal anytime soon.

The announcement by the IAEA that Iran has fulfilled its obligations according to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has triggered “Implementation Day” and the removal of the nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. The JCPOA, however, did not deal with Iran’s ballistic missile program, and the sanctions related to it are still nominally in force. These sanctions are minor and will not have any real effect on the Iranian missile program. The missile program will mature during this period and will include Ghadr missiles with ranges of 1,650-1,950 km, which may be capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

The question now is: whither the Iranian nuclear program? After the lifting of sanctions, and taking into account the impracticality of “snap-back” of sanctions, we assess that Iran will now initiate a parallel nuclear program. This will, of course, be far slower than the program that was dismantled by the JCPOA, but it will be realized long before the 10-year target of the JCPOA. One possibility for Iran to continue its nuclear program is through North Korea. The wording of the JCPOA is ambiguous on nuclear Iranian nuclear cooperation with other countries that are not a party to the agreement. North Korea could produce the whole chain of nuclear weapons and put it at Iran’s disposal in return for Iranian funding. North Korea would certainly profit economically from such collaboration and would not risk further sanctions. Such cooperation would be difficult to detect, and even if detected, may not reach the threshold of a material breach of the JCPOA.

The most immediate reward that Iran will receive is the release of frozen Iranian funds ($100-$150 billion). In addition, Iran may now market oil stored offshore in tankers (about 50 billion barrels) and is preparing to increase its production by 500 thousand bpd (from 2.8 million bpd). It is doubtful that Iran can truly increase its production as planned. Even if it does, the addition of Iranian oil is likely to drive prices down even further, counter-balancing much of the potential profit. Sanctions relief also is not a quick fix for the Iranian economy. While it removes legal impediments for investment and business in Iran, the risks that Western companies will face due to residual non-nuclear sanctions (that may be enhanced and enforced by a future American administration), lack of government protection, corruption, and the weakness of the Iranian market cannot be removed by decree. Therefore, European banks and investors may not hurry to invest in Iran at the levels needed to jump-start the Iranian economy after years of sanctions.

The Iranian regime’s goal is not only to block the path to the reformists or reformist-minded, but also to the extremists on the right to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Such a balance could help the Iranian system maintain its “centrist” orientation and guarantee the continuity in the event of Khamenei’s death and the appointment of a new successor (or a triumvirate of several potential leaders). It will also facilitate the eventual takeover of the regime by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) after the demise of Khamenei. The backing that the Guardian Council received from the Supreme Leader for the results of its vetting process, in the face of Rouhani’s condemnation of the disapproval of almost all reformists, is also indicative of the balance of power in the regime.

The Iranian seizure of two US Navy patrol boats on January 12 and the publication of drone pictures of a US Navy aircraft carrier underlined the sense of immunity that Iran has achieved. These actions should be seen in the context of Iran’s attempt to change the rules of the game in the Persian Gulf, while testing the waters of American tolerance and sending to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States an indirect message that Iran is ready and willing to risk conflict with the US and that the US is a paper tiger that cannot be relied upon in a confrontation between the Gulf States and Iran. In our assessment, Iran will continue with shows of force such as seizing of naval vessels of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, stop and search operations of commercial vessels en route to the Gulf States, naval exercises — including missile tests close to Gulf sea-lanes and to the territorial waters of the Gulf States — in international waterways that implicitly interrupt and threaten shipping in the Gulf, “spooking” of Gulf aircraft and even false flag operations of mining, piracy or attacks by proxies in the Gulf and the Red Sea along the Yemeni coast. We may expect as a result possible frontier skirmishes on the shared littoral borders of Iran and Saudi Arabia, gas fields and disputed islands and in the international waters of the Gulf.

The Iranian seizure of two US Navy patrol boats on January 12 underlined the sense of immunity that Iran has achieved.

Saudi Arabia is drawing up its own map of interests and areas of influence that it is projecting as “no-go zones” for Iran — a Saudi “Monroe Doctrine” for the region. The most critical of these are: Yemen (due to the potential for threatening the Bab al-Mandeb Straits), subversion in the Gulf States (primarily Bahrain), the Strait of Hormuz and the international waters of the Gulf. To this list one must add the obvious: any Iranian-inspired or -planned attack on the Saudi homeland itself — government facilities, oil installations etc. — would be perceived as crossing a red line. While neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran is interested in direct conflict, and both would prefer to continue to work through proxies and in areas outside their respective sovereign territories, the dynamic nature of the situation can easily lend itself to misreading of such red lines and such miscalculation may lead to direct confrontation between them. While all-out direct war between Iran and Saudi Arabia remains a low probability, this assessment should be revisited again in the near future.

In Syria, American positions have undergone a strategic shift that reflects the new balance of power created by the Russian intervention. On the military side, the Russian presence imposes a heavy constraint on the American activities, and U.S. officials caution that the success of the Ramadi operation will not be followed by a concerted effort to roll back the “Islamic State” in the Syrian theater. In regards to a political solution, the US has accepted the Russian-Iranian four-point-plan that envisages Bashar al-Assad remaining in office during a transition period and being allowed to run for President in “internationally supervised elections”. In our assessment, the Syrian opposition and their Arab supporters cannot accept any blueprint that would leave any doubt regarding Bashar al-Assad relinquishing power before any process begins. These developments will only feed the sense of the Sunni Arabs that the United States has turned its back on them and is supporting Iranian-Russian hegemony in the region. On this background, the prospects that the Syrian “peace talks” in Geneva will achieve any progress towards resolution or even mitigation of the civil war are close to nil.

Last month’s visit by Chinese President Xi Jin Ping to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran was the first such visit of a Chinese President in the region since 2002, and the first foreign head of state to visit Iran since the announcement of “Implementation Day” of the JCPOA. The Chinese emphasis in all the visits was on economic cooperation, development and stability, but above all — in an implicit stab at the US and Russia — emphasizing that China does not seek proxies, to fill a power vacuum or hegemony in the region. The leitmotif of the visit was the integration of the Middle Eastern partners (i.e. the Arabs in general and Iran) into China’s “Belt and Road Initiative.” In spite of the inclusion of Iran in the visit, President Xi took care not to offend the Arabs. The agreements with Saudi Arabia included nuclear cooperation in a scope far greater than that which was offered to Iran, and the joint statement reflected the Saudi position on Yemen, stating, “both sides stressed support for the legitimate regime of Yemen.”

The “Arab Policy Paper” published on the eve of the visit stresses China’s commitment to “non-intervention and opposition to interference in the affairs of other countries”. This is seen by the Arab policy communities as a sign of implicit Chinese support for their position vis-à-vis Iran’s activities in the region, though they would have welcomed more explicit statements of support. There is no expectation in the region that China is going to play the “Big Power” card in the region. Taking sides in this conflict would be out of character for China. Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states will attempt to convince China to refrain from demonstrations of rapprochement with Iran and to support the Arab positions vis-à-vis Iranian provocations in the Gulf, Syria and Yemen. While China may show a slight implicit leaning towards the Arab position on these issues, it is not likely to take a clear anti-Iranian/pro-Arab position in the near future.

The European Union-Turkey agreement of 25 November, which provided Turkey with 3 billion euros over two years in order to stop the flow of refugees to Europe, has not achieved that goal. Speaking privately, EU officials complain that Turkey has not taken any concrete measures to reduce the flow of refugees. In our assessment, Turkey will continue to prevaricate on steps to stem the flow of refugees as pressure on the EU to give more concessions. Turkey has already signaled that the sum will not suffice for the task of maintaining the refugees inside Turkey alone, and certainly not for other security measures such as blocking the border with Turkey to prevent passage to and fro of “Islamic State” foreign fighters.

Aside from the 3 billion euros, the EU commitments will also not be easily implemented; visa waivers for Turkish citizens in general will encounter massive opposition within the EU. The road to Turkish accession to the EU must also go through complex negotiations on various aspects of compatibility of Turkey to the standards of the EU. All these discussions will encounter a veto by Cyprus, pending a peace deal with Turkish-occupied Northern Cyprus. This veto may be resolved if a referendum on unification of Cyprus takes place and supports re-unification later this year. However, the real obstacle towards Turkish accession is not technical or due to the Cyprus question; it revolves around the shift in European public opinion towards absorption of immigrants from Muslim countries. During the coming year, there will certainly be further terrorist attacks that will push European public opinion further to the right. Under these circumstances, Turkish accession or even visa waiver will be very unlikely.

In our assessment, the trend towards Kurdish independence will eventually lead to an independent Iraqi Kurdistan. The events in Syrian Kurdistan will also affect the pace and direction of the independence movement in Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Unification of the parts of Syrian Kurdistan in the face of Turkish opposition and under Russian protection will give impetus to the demand to create a political fait accompli of independence in Iraqi Kurdistan. As the principle of Kurdish independence in Iraq gains more and more support and becomes a reality, the irredentist demand for unification of Kurdistan — Iraqi and Syrian — will also begin to be heard. This is the fulfillment of the Kurdish nightmare that Turkey has always feared. With the deterioration of relations between the AKP government and the Turkish Kurds inside Turkey, such a political reality of independent Kurdistan will add fire to the flames of the Kurdish rebellion in southern Turkey. It is highly likely that Russia will take advantage of the trend and support the Kurds, effectively turning an American ally into a Russian one. If this happens, the US will have lost an important potential ally in the new map of the Middle East.

The large number of players on the ground that may take a part in the campaign for Mosul will only complicate the campaign further and — if the city or part of it is retaken, will increase the chances of internal fighting between the components of the ad-hoc alliance of Iraqi government forces, Shiite militias, Sunni militias, Kurdish Peshmarga, Turks and American forces.

On this background, the Syrian “Peace Talks” in Geneva started (29 January) as “proximity talks” in which the UN representatives shuttle between the rooms of the opposing parties. The Saudi supported High Negotiations Committee (HNC) of the Syrian opposition ceded their original conditions — cessation of the attacks on civilians — though they refuse to meet with the regime representatives while the latter refuse to meet with “terrorists”. The Syrian regime representation is low-level as an indication that there is no intention to hold real negotiations. Furthermore, the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), whose military wing, the YPG, is the most effective fighting force on the ground against the “Islamic State,” were not included in the opposition delegation because of the Turkish threat to boycott the Geneva negotiations if it participates. Under these conditions, the prospects that the talks will achieve any progress towards resolution or even mitigation of the civil war are close to nil.

Dr. Shmuel Bar is a senior research fellow at Israel’s Institute for Policy and Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya in Israel and a veteran of Israel’s intelligence community.