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Israel’s Strategic Game of Survival

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“Biden’s actions are a violation of Israel’s sovereignty.”

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Strategic Outlook for Saudi Arabia and Iran by Shmuel Bar

  • In Saudi Arabia, Mohammad bin Salman’s “Vision 2030” is totally identified with his leadership. If it succeeds, he will harvest the praise; on the other hand, many in the Saudi elite will latch on to any sign of failure of his policies in order to block his ambitions.

  • Mohammad bin Salman’s social-political agenda to broaden the power base of the regime to include the young and educated — and to a great extent relatively secular or moderate — will certainly be seen by the Wahhabi clerics and the tribal social conservatives as geared towards reducing their control over the populace and hence their weight in the elite.
  • Another serious risk is that the economic plan entails reducing the Saudi welfare state. The economic and social fallout of weaning the Saudis away from entitlements will be exploited by domestic opposition elements and by Iran.
  • In Iran, the electoral process within the Assembly showed what was not evident during the parliamentary elections held in February, namely that even a formal preeminence of moderates does not and cannot influence the decision making of the Iranian regime and that Khamenei succeeds to pull the strings despite seemingly democratic procedures.
  • After having won the chairmanship of the Assembly, Jannati delivered a speech demanding total loyalty to Khamenei, which can be considered as targeting the moderates.

Following the announcement of Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030” Economic Plan by Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman on April 25, King Salman announced a reshuffling of the government. The reshuffling was clearly orchestrated by the Deputy Crown Prince and reflects his agenda. This shuffle probably is not the last word even in the near term; the changes in the government strengthen the political position of Mohammad bin Salman, because the new ministers owe him their posts, and through them he will strengthen his hold on the levers of government, especially in the economic sphere. His next step may be to move to neutralize Prince Mitab bin Abdullah, the minister in charge of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) and a close ally of Crown Prince Mohammad bin Nayef. He could do this by absorbing SANG into the Ministry of Defense.

Such a step would probably not sit well with many of the members of the royal family; however, if Mohammad bin Salman takes such a step, it will only be with the consent of his father, King Salman, and none would actively oppose him. Such a step would have significant ripple effects; international influence in Saudi Arabia has focused for decades on acquiring sectorial influence in the various centers of power of the Kingdom – the different factions of the royal family, the business sector, the army, the SANG etc. The continuing concentration of power in the hands of Mohammad bin Salman will reduce the political relevance of many of these assets of international players and they will be obliged to restructure their connections and sources of information on the politics and economic decision making of the Kingdom.

Farther down the road — in our assessment not in the short term — King Salman may appoint his son to the position of Prime Minister – a title that he presently holds himself. Such a promotion would pave the way for Mohammad bin Salman to depose the Crown Prince, Mohammad bin Nayef, to be appointed as the next Crown Prince and to succeed his father. A possibility exists — though in our assessment it is not likely in the near future — that the King will even abdicate and pass the reins of the Kingdom to his son after he has been duly appointed as Crown Prince. These scenarios will be a disappointment to policy-shapers in Washington who prefer — or at least feel more comfortable with Mohammad bin Nayef. This too will call for a significant shift in the international disposition towards the Saudi regime; development of channels of influence with Mohammad bin Salman and his confidantes, adapting to a new and unfamiliar paradigm of decision-making in the Kingdom and coping with Mohammad bin Salman’s not-typically-Saudi regional policies towards Iran and other threats.

Mohammad bin Salman’s “Vision 2030” is totally identified with his leadership. If it succeeds, he will harvest the praise; on the other hand, many in the Saudi elite will latch on to any sign of failure of his policies in order to block his ambitions. However, none of them will actively attempt to disrupt Mohammad bin Salman’s plans; such a power struggle could precipitate the end of the rule of the al-Saud family and the very existence of the Saudi state, and they are aware that either they “hang together or they hang separately”. The risks to the regime from the economic reform process, however, do not necessarily come from proactive efforts to disrupt it. Mohammad bin Salman’s social-political agenda to broaden the power base of the regime to include the young and educated — and to a great extent relatively secular or moderate — will certainly be seen by the Wahhabi clerics and the tribal social conservatives as geared towards reducing their control over the populace and hence their weight in the elite. Another serious risk is that the economic plan entails reducing the Saudi welfare state. The economic and social fallout of weaning the Saudis off entitlements will be exploited by domestic opposition elements and by Iran.

Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Salman meets with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on May 7, 2015. (Image source: U.S. State Department)

The changes in the Saudi Oil Ministry reflect Mohammad bin Salman’s strategic policy of using Saudi oil to minimize Iran’s economic and political profits from the lifting of sanctions, even at the expense of Saudi profit from its oil. This policy has broad support in the Saudi elite, with the possible exception of some of the government oil bureaucracy and the oil-related business community. But the latter do not have the power to derail the regime’s priorities in this regard. Therefore, we are likely to see a continuation of the Saudi policy of high production, willingness to offer attractive deals in order to undercut Iranian overtures to existing Saudi markets, and a high level of sensitivity to any threats to the oil industry. The chances of Iranian retaliation for the Saudi economic warfare are high. These could take the shape of cyber-attacks on installations inside Saudi Arabia, or terrorist attacks (including rocket attacks) against pipelines, refineries and other installations, and even attacks – without taking responsibility — on Saudi oil shipping inside the Persian Gulf or — more likely further away from the theater. Such attacks may normally be seen as providing Iran plausible deniability from the point of view of international law, but they will be attributed to Iran by the Saudi regime, that will see itself as obliged to react. Therefore, in the current state of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and assuming that the chances of rapprochement are slim, the chances of actual limited military conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia remain.

* * *

The Islamic State has come under increasing military pressure in both Iraq and Syria in recent weeks, and it is likely to lose territory. Yet this will not make Iraq more united or stable, nor will it bring the civil war in Syria any closer to an end. Iran’s influence in Iraq will grow, while the Sunnis will see the US as Iran’s enabler. The Islamic State will try to respond to its losses by launching major terror attacks in the West. The Islamic State lacks the manpower to defend all the Iraqi and Syrian territory it has occupied since 2014. Consequently, its strategy consists first and foremost of defending strategically or symbolically important assets, primarily al-Raqqah, Fallujah and Mosul, as well as key supply routes. In addition, it is compensating for its defeats by carrying out lethal terror attacks in Syria and Iraq in order to demonstrate that while these regimes can, with foreign backing, regain territory, they cannot defend their citizens.

The military successes against the Islamic State will entail a number of long-range problematic political implications: exacerbation of the Sunni-Shiite conflict in Iraq and in the region in general, strengthening Iranian influence on the back of American military power, increased animosity towards the US, and widening the gap between the Baghdad government and the Kurds. The Islamic State will eventually be pushed out of Fallujah, thanks to the American support. Once the Islamic State is pushed out of Fallujah and perhaps out of Mosul, Shiite militias will move in to exact their revenge. Fallujah will again be a fertile ground for Sunni radicalism and a new Sunni insurgency in the area is almost inevitable; the Sunni populace will probably rebel again under some successor of the Islamic State and Fallujah will have to be “liberated” again. Furthermore, the American airstrikes in support of the Shiite ground offensive will strengthen the image of the US as enabler of the Iranian takeover of Iraq and as responsible for Shiite atrocities. Atrocities committed in Fallujah by the Shiite militias under American auspices will give pause to the plans for initiating an offensive on Mosul.

The Iraqi political system which the Americans constructed is on the verge of final collapse. The stalemate over the election of a new cabinet and “popular” demonstrations staged by Muqtada al-Sadr are indicative of the inherent failure of the Iraqi political system. While al-Sadr had proven that he can paralyze the government and the Parliament, he cannot become the solution. He has helped to demolish an already dysfunctional political system, but his sources of political influence draw on the very factors that made that system dysfunctional: sectarianism, a politicized military, use of “popular” violence to challenge democratic procedures, involvement of religious authorities in the democratic process, involvement of external actors (particularly Iran) and the implicit threat of armed militias. Since the current crisis derives from the power struggle within the Shiite community, it will hinge to a great degree on Iran. It may escalate to a Shiite civil war, and such a scenario would probably draw Iran to intervene directly, or to encourage a Shiite military commander to stage a coup and establish military rule, then pledge his allegiance to Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei. We assess that the US, under the current administration, would probably acquiesce to “Pax Iranica” in Iraq, but the more influence any settlement would accord Iran, the more it would be unacceptable to the Gulf States, and they would use their influence with the Sunnis and the Kurds to block it, inter alia, by increasing support of radical Sunni groups in the country.

The cause of Kurdish independence is gaining momentum; all the Kurdish factions seem to be dedicated to holding a referendum on Kurdish independence before the elections in the US in order to create a fait accompli for the next administration. The issue of independence, however, is linked to the demand of the new PUK-Gorran alliance for parliamentary elections and for the inclusion of mixed Arab-Kurdish areas that the Peshmerga seized from the Islamic State in those elections and in the independence referendum. (Foremost of these areas are the oil-rich area of Kirkuk, the provinces of Nineveh, Diyala, and Salah ad-Din and the regional capital of Mosul that is still in the hands of the Islamic State). If the Kurdish Region succeeds in annexing these areas, it will also signify a watershed event in the process of the breakup of Iraq.

Turkey and Iran will both oppose these plans and the current US administration will not lend its support to a move that, in essence, proves the failure of its Iraq policy and signals the breakup of Iraq. Specifically, the prize of Kirkuk for the Kurdish state would be prodigious; the Baghdad government has halted the export of oil produced by its oil company in Kirkuk to Turkey in retaliation for the KRG’s independent oil exports. If Kirkuk Province joins the Kurdish Region, the KRG would presumably be able to take control of Kirkuk’s oil and resume its export to Turkey or — if the PUK-Gorran alliance comes to power in the KRG — to opt for the Iranian offer of export through Iran to the Persian Gulf.

Turkey views the Raqqa offensive in Syria with great concern. The American connection with the Kurdish YPG, which is viewed in Ankara as an extension of the PKK, is seen as yet another indication of the US inching towards support of an independent Kurdistan — the chronic nightmare of Turkey. Furthermore, if the Islamic State is pushed out of al-Raqqa and surrounding areas by the YPG, these areas will come under the control of Syrian Kurdistan (Rojava). Even before such a scenario emerges, the Islamic State’s priority of defending its regional capital, Raqqa will probably bring it to redeploy its forces now deployed in the Jarablus-Azaz Corridor, the stretch of land along the Syrian-Turkish border which separates the eastern Kurdish territory from the western enclave around the town of Afrin, north of Aleppo. The withdrawal of Islamic State forces from this corridor would tempt the YPG to launch an offensive westward from Jarablus in order to link up with the Afrin enclave. Such a prize would be a far greater achievement for the YPG than the capture of the non-Kurdish Raqqa area, and it would probably prefer it. If the YPG indeed takes such a step, it is likely to precipitate Turkish intervention, turning Turkey — a NATO member — into an active participant in the Syrian civil war against a party that is allied with both the US and Russia.

* * *

In Iran, Despite the hopes of the moderate camp, the hardliner 90-year-old Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati was elected (May 24) as head of the Assembly of Experts, after having gained 55 of 88 votes. This nomination does not bode well for President Rouhani’s future, should he insist on implementing deeper liberalizing reforms.

More than anything else, Ayatollah Jannati’s election highlights the Supreme leader’s grip on power. Ayatollah Khamenei did his best to help Jannati’s election by delivering his directives to some members of the Assembly. The electoral process within the Assembly showed what was not evident during the parliamentary elections held in February, namely that even a formal preeminence of moderates does not and cannot influence the decision making of the Iranian regime, and that Khamenei pulls the strings despite seemingly democratic procedures. The Assembly of Experts is rather formal and ceremonial body, unlike the Majles, however its role might become crucial at some circumstances, should the Assembly be summoned to nominate the following leader in the event of Khamenei’s death.

Ahmad Jannati, is important by virtue of what he epitomizes as a symbol rather than by his current political capacity, which won’t persist long, given his age. He has been serving as secretary of the Guardian Council since 1992, and in this capacity was instrumental in consolidating Khamenei’s power and, in all elections, was responsible for weeding out “undesirable” candidates to the Majles and Assembly of Experts. After having won the chairmanship of the Assembly, Jannati delivered a speech demanding total loyalty to Khamenei, which can be considered as targeting the moderates. Jannati is not alone with this mindset: his respective first and second deputies are hardliners: Mohammad Kermani and Mahmoud Shahroudi. The latter served for many years as the head of the judiciary, is close to Khamenei and is mentioned as a potential successor to Khamenei. This casting of the Assembly of Experts highlights that Khamenei is preparing to guarantee his ideological legacy and the ideological continuity of the regime after his death.

The election of Jannati was even more conspicuous in the light of the corresponding withdrawal of the chief candidate of the moderates, who they had hoped would serve as an ally within the regime — former President Hashemi Rafsanjani. Rafsanjani decided to withdraw from the electoral competition under pressure by the hardliners, including attacks on his children, his daughter, Faezah and his son, Mehdi.

On May 28, Ali Larijani was elected as the speaker of the Majles for the third term. Larijani is considered a hardliner; for over 30 years, he has been a confidant of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. His brother Sadeq Larijani is chief of the judiciary, and his other brothers have played important roles in diplomacy and government affairs. A veteran of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Larijani is also the son of Grand Ayatollah Hashem Amoli and son-in-law to prominent Islamic ideologue Morteza Motahhari. The moderate conservative politician Ali Motahhari is his brother-in-law. Given this multifaceted background, he has been able to establish strong, longstanding ties with both the military and the clergy, and with different factions in the Majles, with the exception of former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who became Larijani’s nemesis. During Ahmadinejad’s second term, Larijani openly confronted him.

By contrast, Larijani is considered close to President Hassan Rouhani. During the nuclear negotiations, Larijani contained anti-Rouhani moves in the legislature and got the Majles to ratify the agreement. However, it must be clear that he did this not because he is Rouhani’s ally, but because he was ordered to carry out this mission by the Supreme Leader. Hence, Larijani will remain supportive of Rouhani, but only on the condition that the latter complies with the wishes of the Supreme Leader. If Larijani decides to stand for office, he may leverage his position in the Majles and his status with the Supreme Leader to whittle away at Rouhani’s popularity.

In the meantime, the Majles will be more supportive of Rouhani. Out of the 80 Majles members who opposed the nuclear agreement, fewer than a dozen remain. None of them is high profile, and their low numbers prevent them from establishing a bloc of their own, as they did in the previous parliament. Instead, they will have to operate within a “Principlists” bloc that is dominated by more moderate “Principlist” figures. This means that the remaining hardliners will be less likely to stage the theatrics that were so successful in challenging the government during the last Majles, particularly through their repeated summoning of various ministers to answer questions; and the impeachment of the minister of science, technology and higher education. Their absence will lead to a calmer parliamentary environment, more focused on addressing the serious economic issues Iran faces such as unemployment, reform of the banking sector, and the steep economic slowdown. This notwithstanding, one should bear in mind that the above scenario is confined to the functioning of the Majles vis-à-vis Rouhani, whereas the real chances of success of his program depend on other foci of power.

Dr. Shmuel Bar is a senior research fellow at the Samuel Neaman Institute for National Policy Studies at the Technion in Haifa, Israel, and a veteran of Israel’s intelligence community.

Stabbing Policemen, “Slut-Shaming” and New Death Threats One Month of Islam and Multiculturalism in France: June 2016 by Yves Mamou

  • Muslim perpetrators rationalize their violence by convincing themselves that they live in a racist society that rejects them and their religion. And the government legitimizes them when it asks Parliament to vote for a law that favors “diversity” on public television channels.

  • Islamist terrorist Larossi Abballa, 26, stabbed to death police officer Jean-Baptiste Salvaing and his wife, police administrator Jessica Schneider, in front of their son, at their home in the Paris suburb of Magnanville. The murderer then live-streamed a video on Facebook, in which he pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS).
  • After the Islamist, anti-gay attack in Orlando, left-wing politician Jean-Luc Mélenchon wrote in his blog that he fears a possible “wave of hatred against Muslims”. For many Islamists in France, the Muslim is always the victim, even when he is the killer.

Islamization is gaining ground in the Muslim community of France. For a long time, this trend remained restricted to the cultural sphere and created strong controversies between Islamists and secular intellectuals (such as the ban on face-covering veils in schools and public places). But the debate stopped being a debate. Sometimes Islamic intolerance takes on the appearance of a civil war. The violence, which was mostly concentrated in the suburbs prior to the January 2015 terrorist attack on the satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo, is spreading now to the heart of French cities. Murders, assaults, death threats and “slut-shaming” happens almost every day here and there.

Muslim perpetrators rationalize their violence by convincing themselves that they live in a racist society that rejects them and their religion. And the government legitimizes them when it asks Parliament to vote for a law that favors “diversity” on public television channels. What is interesting is that judiciary system seems in disarray and does not know how to treat these types of conflicts: two jihadists back from Syria are condemned to a suspended sentence of six months in prison and a Muslim who slapped a female waiter because she served alcohol during the Ramadan was sentenced to eight months in prison.

The absence of political guidelines spreads fear and aids the rise of the right-wing political party, the Front National.

June 1. Karim Benzema, a French soccer star of Algerian descent, declared, in the Spanish sports newspaper Marca, that French national team’s coach, Didier Deschamps “bowed to the pressure of a racist part of France” by not including him in the team. Benzema was not included in the national soccer team for the UEFA Euro 2016 championship because he is apparently involved in a sex-tape extortion scandal targeting his colleague, Mathieu Valbuena.

June 2. Patrick Kanner, Minister of Urban Affairs, Youth and Sport, said in Le Parisien that Karim Benzema plays an “unfair and dangerous” game when he implies that “ethnic reasons” might have played a role in the decision not to include him in the French soccer team.

June 2. It was reported that the Saudi preacher, Mohammed Ramzan Al-Hajiri, was banned from entering France until 2050. The daily, La Voix du Nord, reported that on May 15, the salafist Abou Bakr Essedik mosque of Roubaix had arranged for him to preach by phone. In April 2014, the same Saudi preacher had declared in public: “Losing your faith makes you no better than an animal” and “to kill a Muslim is a less serious crime than to make him an infidel.”

June 5. A 25-year-old Frenchman was arrested at the border between Ukraine and Poland. According to the TV channel M6, his truck was loaded with three portable rocket launchers, more than 100 kilograms of TNT, 100 detonators and half a dozen Kalashnikov assault rifles. He was unknown to security services and was planning terrorist attacks against synagogues and mosques in France.

June 6. One thousand migrants from Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia, who were living in tents in the 18th district of Paris (Les Jardins d’Eole), were evacuated peacefully by police. According to the media, it is the 23rd operation of this kind in Paris since 2015

June 6. Swastikas and the words “white power” were tagged on the walls of the synagogue of Verdun. A similar incident of vandalism took place two months prior, said Jean-Claude Lévy, leader of the Jewish community in Verdun.

June 6. Gérard Tardy, mayor of Lorette, a small city in the Loire region of France, posted two messages on the electronic information boards of the city:

  • “Ramadan must be lived in peace without noise”
  • “In the Republic, nobody covers his face.”

The far left and Muslims organizations said these messages were “outrageous” and “disrespectful” to Muslims.

June 7. A waitress at a bar in Nice was violently slapped by a Muslim because she was serving alcohol to customers on the first day of Ramadan. Both the owner of the bar and the victim filed a complaint at the police station. The attacker escaped.

June 8. In Grigny, an outer suburb of Paris, people filmed used their smartphones to film a riot between “youths” [the French media’s euphemism for young Muslims] and police, and aired it live on Periscope, an “app” for instant video. No one knows what caused the riot. A father living in Grigny said, “In my time, violence with cops had always a motive: arrest, a stolen car… But now, it is different. It looks like people fight with police for fun”.

June 8. At midnight, Aya Ramadan, a female activist of the Parti des Indigènes de la République, posted on Twitter her congratulations to the two Palestinian terrorists who shot people in a bar in Tel Aviv, killing three. She wrote; “Dignity and pride! Cheers to the two Palestinians who have led a resistance operation in Tel Aviv.”

Gilles Clavreul, the High Commissioner of the Fight against Racism and anti-Semitism, said he would sue Ramadan for acting as an “apologist for terrorism.” The maximum punishment for such an offense is two years in prison and €100,000 fine. The Parti des Indigènes de la République is a racialist organization developing a political ideology to take the power from the “whites” to give it to the “colored people” in France.

June 8. The Observatory of Secularism (Observatoire de la laïcité), an official body linked to the prime minister’s office, published its annual report. According to the report, anti-Semitic attacks remain at a high level (808 attacks) and anti-Muslim attacks have tripled (from 133 last year to 429 in 2015). The report failed to establish a proportion between the number of Jews in France (half a million) and the number of Muslims (between six to ten million). The report also does not relate that most anti-Jewish acts are committed by Muslims. The Observatory of Secularism found itself in the eye of a storm last year for its complacency towards Islamism.

June 9. Jacqueline Eustache-Brinio, Mayor of Saint-Gratien, declared war on shops with veiled saleswomen. She wrote on her Facebook page. “I have decided to boycott all shops who impose veiled cashiers and veiled saleswomen on me.” She says she is committed to support, by all means possible, women who refuse to wear veil.

June 9. Provocation? The Parti des Indigénes de la République issued a public invitation to all Muslims to begin the night of Ramadan in front of Saint Denis Basilica, a huge Catholic monument that played an important role in history of France. The Catholic kings of France were crowned and are buried in the Basilica.

June 9. Soldiers protecting a synagogue in Garges (a Paris suburb) were attacked with a barrage of stones launched by a group of twenty people. One soldier was wounded.

June 8. Twenty MPs co-signed and published an open letter in the news magazine Valeurs Actuelles, addressed to Minister of Education Najat Vallaud-Belkacem. They were protesting the decision of the Ministry of Education to promote teaching Arabic at schools to young children of five or six years old. “This decision is stupid. Priority must be given to teaching French, the language of the Republic”.

June 13. Jean-Luc Mélenchon, of left-wing New Anticapitalist Party (NPA), wrote in his blog after the Islamist, anti-gay attack in Orlando, that he fears a possible “wave of hatred against Muslims”. For many Islamists in France, the Muslim is always the victim, even when he is the killer.

June 13. Islamist terrorist Larossi Abballa, 26, stabbed to death police officer Jean-Baptiste Salvaing and his wife, police administrator Jessica Schneider, in front of their son, at their home in the Paris suburb of Magnanville. The murderer then live-streamed a video on Facebook, in which he pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS). When police stormed the house, they rescued the three-year-old boy. According to Le Figaro, the killer had been sentenced in 2013 to three years of prison for participating in recruiting jihadists and funneling them into Pakistan, but was released almost immediately.

Paris police officer Jean-Baptiste Salvaing (left) and his wife, police administrator Jessica Schneider (right), were stabbed to death in front of their son by Islamist terrorist Larossi Abballa (inset) on June 13. The murderer then live-streamed a video on Facebook, in which he pledged allegiance to the Islamic State.

June 14. A 19-year-old female student was stabbed at a bus station in the city of Rennes. Passersby succeeded in capturing her attacker, a Muslim man who said he was obeying “voices” that ordered him to make a “sacrifice for Ramadan.” The young woman was taken to a hospital, and the attacker was taken to a psychiatric hospital.

June 14. In reaction to the June 13 murder of two police officers by an Islamist terrorist, the government authorized all policemen to keep their gun on them when they are not on duty.

June 15. According to the Belgian daily La Dernière Heure, the Belgian antiterrorism service informed police departments that ISIS fighters left Syria at the beginning of June to be sent to France and Belgium to commit terrorist attacks.

June 15. Maude Vallet, 18 years old, was harassed, insulted and threatened by five women in a bus because she was wearing shorts on her way back from the beach. She wrote her story on Facebook: “Hi, I am a bitch”. She denounced traditions and the clergy, but refused to mention that these “slut-shaming” attackers were Muslim women. She said the ethnicity to which they belonged was not relevant.

June 15. Ali S, 32, a Tunisian who slapped a female waiter in a bar in Nice because she was serving alcohol during Ramadan was sentenced to eight months in prison and ordered to pay 1000 euros to the waitress. Because he was residing illegally in France, he will be deported and prohibited from returning to France for three years.

June 16. A street encampment of around 400 Sudanese and Afghan migrants, mostly men, was evacuated by the police in the 18th district of Paris. It is the 24th evacuation since June 15, 2015.

June 16. In reaction to the June 13 murder of two police officers by an Islamist terrorist, the right-wing politicians began campaigning to send 13,000 people registered as an “S” (people who live in France and suspected of being affiliated with a terrorist organization) to special “camps”.

June 16. A 22-year-old convert to Islam was arrested in Carcassonne with a knife and a machete. He confessed to the police that he wanted to kill American and English tourists before stabbing a policeman or a soldier. He is being held in custody in Toulouse. The man is registered as an “S”.

June 18. Abou Kamel Chahid threatened on Facebook to commit terrorist attacks in France. “We are four brothers, each has a mission. I swear by Allah, France is going leave the coalition. They won’t have choice. These kouffars [infidels] will never feel well in this country. Be careful, brothers and sisters, things are going to accelerate”.

June 18. For a year, the public multimedia library of Lannion (Britany) has been suffered a rash of vandalizations of its books, comics and DVDs — all relating to the Jews, such as books about the Holocaust and comics by Johan Sfar, the author of “La chat du rabbin” (“The Rabbi’s Cat”), a bestselling comic book.

June 19: An inmate of the Beziers prison in the south of France was sentenced to an additional six months in prison because he said he wanted to commit a terrorist attack against the nudist beach of the Cap d’Agde. The man, Alain G, a convert to Islam, was reported by other inmates.

June 19: 4000 French Muslims responded to a call launched by a group of Mosques in the area of Magnanville, a Paris suburb, to participate in a silent march in tribute to two police officers stabbed to death at their home. It is the first time that French Muslims showed some collective solidarity with non-Muslims against Islamic terrorism. Pressure from the media had been huge to make the demonstration into a show. There was, however, some criticism: MP Guénhaël Huet tweeted “sincerity or duplicity?”. Many other critics observed the absence of women among the marchers, which was analyzed as a sign of the deepening of Islamist ideology among the French Muslims. When the marchers arrived in front of the police station to lay down flowers, no policemen came out to thank them or shake hands.

June 20. After three days of controversy on social media, it appeared that the policeman who refused to shake hands with President François Hollande at a memorial ceremony for the two police officers murdered by the Islamist, Larossi Abballa, was not a member of right-wing Front National party. According to Le Monde, the policeman just wanted to protest against the shrinking budget of the police.

June 21. The NGO “Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture” (“Action des chrétiens pour l’abolition de la torture”) released a poll about the perception of torture by the French. The results were astounding:

  • 36% said it is acceptable to use torture “in exceptional circumstances.” The number was 25% in 2000 [Poll Amnesty/CSA. 2000].
  • 54% of those polled found it “justifiable” to use electric shocks to torture a terrorist suspected of planting a bomb.
  • 45% said they considered torture an efficient tool against terrorism.
  • 18% said they thought they could torture a terrorist themselves. 40% of Front National supporters said they thought they could torture a terrorist themselves.

June 21. More than 1000 women (mostly Muslims) signed a petition demanding separate hours for women at the public swimming pool of Mantes la Jolie, a Paris suburb. The petition included a request for only female employees to be present during women’s hours. Officials, in the name of secularism, refused the request.

June 21. The daily, Libération, published a report on the Turkish government’s strategy to gain control of Islamic institutions in France.

June 21. A Muslim security guard operating in the “fan zone” of the UEFA Euro soccer tournament in Nice was seen praying while on duty. Police were called to expel him; bystanders were afraid he was a terrorist.

June 22. The investment company Mayhoola, affiliated with the royal family of Qatar, the al-Thanis, spent half-a-billion euros for a controlling interest in the French fashion company Balmain. The same day, the news magazine Marianne published a full survey about the real estate properties of the royal Qatari family in France: 3 billion euros ($3.3 billion USD) in villas, buildings, malls, etc.

June 22. A Muslim from La Chapelle-Basse-Mer (western France) was given a four month suspended prison sentence, a €300 fine, and ordered to pay €1000 in damages each to the two people he threatened to kill, as well as €300 for court costs. In December 2015, he drove his car into a schoolyard and threatened to kill the cook and deputy cook of the school, because his eight-year-old son had eaten pork at the school cafeteria. The boy was hungry and apparently did not want to wait for a substitute meal for vegetarians and Muslims.

June 23: At 3am, in the heart of Barbes, the Muslim quarter of Paris, two men on a motor-scooter opened fire on a group of young men walking in the street. No one was wounded. The police found two 9mm bullet casings on the scene.

June 24: In Toulon, a hundred women demonstrated in the street, all of them wearing shorts. They said they wanted to support Maude Vallet who had been attacked in a bus by five women; the attackers had said that by wearing shorts, she did not respect herself. Like Maude Vallet, the demonstrators refused to mention that all the attackers had been Muslims. Instead, the demonstrators repeated the traditional litany that “it has nothing to do with Islam”.

June 24: In Portes-lès-Valence, an Islamist under surveillance by security services was convicted and imprisoned for the murder of his three-year-old stepdaughter. He had beaten the child to death. The mother was also charged for failing to report the abuse.

June 25: Can a female lawyer testify in court while wearing a veil? This controversy engulfed the bar association of Seine Saint Denis, a suburb of Paris. On June 24, at a students’ moot court competition, a young woman appeared with a tuque, a traditional hat which no lawyers in France wear anymore. But, in a visible way, under the tuque, she was wearing a Muslim veil. The controversial question of whether this is now a hot topic. Many observers think that the tuque will be reintroduced in France by Islamist lawyers in the next few months.

June 26: Bernard Cazeneuve posthumously admitted Hervé Cornara to the Order of Légion d’Honneur. A year ago, Cornara, a businessman, was murdered and beheaded by his Muslim employee, Yassine Salhi, who claimed to act on behalf of the Islamic State. Salhi placed Cornara’s severed head on display, alongside twin ISIS flags, at the gas factory near Lyon where they worked.

June 27: The press reported that two days earlier, 300 hundred migrants from Sudan, Eritrea and Afghanistan engaged in a mass brawl in the 18th district of Paris. The brawl apparently erupted because a woman was sexually harassed by a man from a different ethnic group. The police used tear gas grenades to stop the violence.

June 27: In Ales (southern France), Abdellah, a Moroccan, apparently had no money to pay for his meal at the Sushi bar where he had eaten, so he ran out of the restaurant with his girlfriend. When the police caught him, he began to shout:

“You pork-eaters! You sausage-eaters… We are going to kick France’s ass. Long live the Kouachis [brothers who murdered the Charlie Hebdo journalists in January 2015]! I swear to God, I have a Kalashnikov…”

Abdellah was sentenced to two years in prison for “defending terrorism,” and was ordered to pay the Sushi bar bill.

June 28: Azzeddine Taïbi, a communist, was elected mayor of Stains, a suburban city known for its Salafist population. On the same day, the Administrative Court of Montreuil rejected an appeal by the Seine-Saint-Denis Prefecture demanding the removal of a banner in support of Marwan Barghouti. Barghouti is currently serving five life sentences in an Israel prison for

“orchestrating three shooting attacks that killed 5 people: one attack in Jerusalem… in which Greek monk Tsibouktsakis Germanus was murdered… and one shooting and stabbing attack at the Sea Food Market restaurant in Tel Aviv (March 5, 2002). When arrested by Israel in 2002, Barghouti headed the Tanzim (Fatah terror faction).”

Barghouti’s supporters try to paint him as the “Palestinian Mandela.” So, today, the portrait of Barghouti is back covering “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” on the pediment of the Seine-Saint-Denis Hall.

June 29: The prosecutor’s office in Paris opened in inquiry into death threats posted on social networks against the magazine, Charlie Hebdo. Some twenty “very threatening” messages, including the death threats, were posted on Charlie Hebdo’s Facebook page for three or four days in mid-June, Le Parisien reported. Police are investigating.

June 30: The French government introduced amendments to the “Equality and Citizenship” bill, to fight against “prejudice” and make “diversity” (ethnic minorities) more visible on public television.

According to the latest “barometer of diversity,” only 14% of people perceived as “non-white” (in the terminology) are present on the air. Erika Bareigts, secretary of state in charge of “real equality,” said that “diversity is the reality of French society, and we must show it. This soothes the debate, and everybody needs it.” She added: “The media do not show non-whites in positive or starring roles. That must change.”

June 30: Two jihadists, back from Syria, where they joined the Islamic State, were sentenced to six-month suspended prison terms. The jihadists are 16 and 17 years old. They stayed only six months in Syria and said they left ISIS because of the “rotten ambiance” in their battalion, which was composed of French volunteers.

Yves Mamou, based in France, worked for two decades as a journalist for Le Monde.

Spicer’s Mistake and the Democrat’s Over-Reaction by Alan M. Dershowitz

Sean Spicer made a serious mistake when he compared Bashar Al-Assad to Hitler, and to make matters worse, he got his facts wrong. He quickly and fully apologized. There was no hint of anti-Semitism in his historical mistake and his apology should have ended the matter. But his political enemies decided to exploit his mistake by pandering to Jews. In doing so, it is they who are exploiting the memory of the six million during the Passover Holiday.


The Democratic National Committee issued a rebuke with the headline “We will not stand for anti-Semitism.”  Its content included the following: “Denying the atrocities committed by Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime is a tried and true tactic used by Neo-Nazis and white supremacists groups that have become emboldened since Donald Trump first announced his campaign for president.”  By placing Hitler and Trump in the same sentence, the DNC committed a mistake similar to that for which they justly criticized Spicer.  Moreover, the DNC itself, is co-chaired by a man who for many years did “stand for anti-Semitism” —  namely Keith Ellison who stood  by the notorious anti-Semite Louis Farrakhan, while denying that he was aware of Farrakhan’s very public Jew-hatred.  It is the epitome of Chutzpah for the DNC to falsely accuse Spicer of standing by anti-Semitism while it is they who are co-chaired by a man who committed that sin.  In another display of Chutzpah, Jeremy Ben Ami of J Street an organization that supports Keith Ellison characterized Spicer’s statement as “unforgivable.”  I do not recall him saying that Ellison’s collaboration with a notorious anti-Semite was “unforgivable.”  Indeed, Ben Ami quickly forgave him and continues to support him.

Nancy Pelosi, the House Minority leaders, falsely accused Spicer of “downplaying the horror of the Holocaust.” But by leveling that false accusation, Pelosi herself is exploiting the tragedy.

Steven Goldstein, a hard-left radical who heads a phony organization that calls itself “The Anne Frank Center for Mutual Respect,” accused Spicer of “engage[ing] in Holocaust denial.” He called Spicer’s mistake a “most evil slur” against the Jewish people. Goldstein claims to speak for the Jewish people, but he represents only himself and a few handfuls of radical followers who are not in any way representative of the mainstream Jewish community. He repeatedly exploits the Holocaust in order to gain publicity for him and his tiny group of followers. Shame on them!

These over the top reactions to a historical mistake made by Spicer that was not motivated by anti-Semitism represents political exploitation of the Holocaust. Spicer was wrong in seeking to bolster his argument against Assad by referring to Hitler, and his political opponents are wrong in exploiting the tragedy of the Holocaust to score partisan points against him.

The difference is that Spicer gaffe was not in any way pre-meditated, whereas the exploitation by his enemies was carefully calculated for political gain. All sides must stop using references to Hitler and the Holocaust in political dialogue. Historical analogies are by their nature generally flawed. Analogies to the Holocaust are always misguided, and often offensive, even if not so intended.

On CNN the other night, Don Lemon asked me if I was “offended as a Jew” by what Spicer had said. The truth is that I was offended as someone who cares about historical accuracy by Spicer’s apparent lack of knowledge regarding the Nazi’s use of chemicals such as Zyklon B to murder Jews during the Holocaust. But it never occurred to me that Spicer’s misstatements were motivated by anti-Semitism, Holocaust denial or an intent to “slur” the Jewish people. Nor do I believe that those who have accused him of such evil motivations actually believe it. They deliberately attributed an evil motive to him in order to pander to Jewish listeners. That offends me more than anything Spicer did.

Extreme right wing anti-Semitism continues to be a problem in many parts of Europe and among a relatively small group of “alt-right” Americans. But hard left and Muslim extremist anti-Semitism is a far greater problem in America today, especially on university campuses. So those of us who hate all forms of anti-Semitism and bigotry, regardless of its source, must fight this evil on a non-partisan basis. We must get our priorities straight, focusing on the greatest dangers regardless of whether they come from the right or the left, from Republicans or Democrats. The fight against bigotry is a bi-partisan issue and must not be exploited for partisan gain.

Spain: Courses on Islam in Public Schools A Gateway to Radical Islam?

  • The guidelines for teaching Islam in public schools — drafted by the Islamic Commission of Spain and approved by the Ministry of Education — are aimed at stirring religious fervor and promoting Islamic identity among young Muslims in Spain.

  • The guidelines, which envision the teaching of every aspect of Islamic doctrine, culture and history, are interspersed with “politically correct” terminology… but the overall objective is clear: to inculcate young people with an Islamic worldview.
  • According to the guidelines, preschoolers (ages 3- 6) are to learn the Islamic profession of faith, the Shahada, which asserts that “there is no God but Allah and Mohammed is his messenger.” The Shahada is the gateway into Islam: one becomes a Muslim by repeating the Shahada three times in front of a witness. They are also encouraged to “emulate, through different forms of expression, the values observed by Mohammed.”
  • In primary school (ages 6-12), the guidelines call for children to “recognize Mohammed as the final prophet sent by Allah and accept him as the most important.”

The Spanish government has published new guidelines for teaching Islam in public preschools and primary and secondary schools.

The guidelines are being touted as a way to prevent Muslim children and young people from being drawn into terrorism by exposing them to a “moderate” interpretation of Islam.

On closer inspection, however, the guidelines — drafted by the Islamic Commission of Spain and approved by the Ministry of Education — are aimed at stirring religious fervor and promoting Islamic identity among young Muslims in Spain.

The new plan, which is the most ambitious in all of Europe, amounts to a government-approved program to establish a full-fledged Islamic studies curriculum at public schools nationwide, at a time when Christian religious symbols are being systematically removed from Spanish public schools by official enforcers of secularism.

Although Spanish taxpayers are being expected to pay for the religious education of up to 300,000 Muslim students between the ages of 3 and 18, it remains unclear whether Spanish authorities will have any oversight of the teaching of Islam in public schools. The government has agreed to allow local Muslim organizations to draft the course syllabi, choose the textbooks, and even determine who will teach the classes.

Spain’s Ministry of Education quietly published the guidelines in the official state gazette (Boletín Oficial del Estado) on March 18. The curriculum for teaching Islam in Spanish public preschools can be found here; in public primary schools here; and in public secondary schools here.

The guidelines, which envision the teaching of every aspect of Islamic doctrine, culture and history, are interspersed with “politically correct” terminology — the documents are rife with buzzwords such as coexistence, diversity, equality, human rights, inclusion, integration, intercultural education, interreligious dialogue, moderation, pluralism, religious liberty, respect and tolerance — but the overall objective is clear: to inculcate young people with an Islamic worldview.

According to the guidelines, preschoolers (ages 3- 6) are to learn the Islamic profession of faith, the Shahada, which asserts that “there is no God but Allah and Mohammed is his messenger.” The Shahada is the gateway into Islam: one becomes a Muslim by repeating the Shahada three times in front of a witness.

Block 6 is aimed at instilling “interest for Islamic religious and cultural texts,” stirring “curiosity for the Koran in oral and written language,” and learning “Islamic recitations, narrations and descriptions.”

Children should develop an “attitude of listening to Koranic and prophetic texts” and memorize “short Hadiths [reports about the words, actions or habits of Mohammed] and Koranic stories.” They are also encouraged to “emulate, through different forms of expression, the values observed by Mohammed.”

In primary school (ages 6-12), the guidelines call for children to “recognize Mohammed as the final prophet sent by Allah and accept him as the most important.” Students are to “recite the Shahada in perfect Arabic and Spanish,” and “recognize that the Koran is a guide for all of humanity.” Children are to “know certain Arabisms in the Spanish language and appreciate the linguistic contributions of Islam to the history of Spain, using verbal language to communicate emotions and sentiments.”

Primary school students are to “know examples of Mohammed’s coexistence with non-Muslims,” although there is no indication that Muslim pupils will be taught about the 900 Jews of the Banu Qurayza tribe in Medina that Mohammed ordered to be beheaded in 627AD.

Students are also to “understand that Islam is a religion of peace — spiritual or internal peace and social or communitarian peace. The prophet teaches us to live in peace. Islam promotes solutions to resolve conflicts and social inequality.”

Moreover, the guidelines call for primary students to “comprehend and explain the existence of other monotheistic revelations of Allah: Judaism and Christianity.” But it remains unclear whether students will learn about the three instances in the Koran (Suras 2:65, 5:60 and 7:166) in which Allah turns Jews into apes and/or pigs.

In secondary school (ages 12-18), the guidelines call for students to “know, analyze and explain the affective-emotional attitudes of Mohammed when confronting personal offenses, valuing conflict resolution.” It remains unclear whether students will learn about Suras 5:33 and 33:57-61, which call for curses against those who “annoy Allah and His Messenger.”

Block 4 calls on students to evaluate the “transversality present in the Koran and the Hadiths regarding social relations.” It does not, however, mention whether students will be taught that the Koran and the Hadiths require non-Muslim subjects (dhimmis) residing in Muslim lands to pay a protection tax known as the jizya.

In a section on the “Islamic model for economics and jurisprudence,” students are asked to identify Islamic solutions to world problems. They are also asked to “analyze and explain the benefits of interest-free loans [aka Sharia finance].”

In Block 8, students are asked to “analyze the stages of the establishment and flourishing of Islamic jurisprudence [Sharia law] during the splendor of al-Andalus.”

Al-Andalus is the Arabic name given to those parts of Spain, Portugal and France that were occupied by Muslim conquerors (also known as the Moors) from 711 to 1492. The Islamic State (ISIS) has repeatedly vowed to “liberate” al-Andalus from non-Muslims and make it part of their new Islamic Caliphate.

The guidelines also encourage students to use the internet to learn more about Islam, even though the internet is playing an increasingly important role in the radicalization of young Muslims.

The legal basis for teaching Islam in Spanish public schools can be found in Article 27.3 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978, which establishes that although Spain is non-confessional (meaning that it does not recognize an official state religion), “the State guarantees parents the right for their children to obtain a religious and moral education which conforms to their own convictions.” Muslims (and Roman Catholics) have long understood this to mean that children are entitled to religious education in public schools.

On November 10, 1992, the Socialist government of Felipe González — seeking to end the monopoly of the Roman Catholic Church over Spanish education — negotiated a “Cooperation Agreement between the Government of Spain and the Islamic Commission of Spain” (Comisión Islámica de España, CIE). That agreement, codified in Law 26/1992, recognized Islam as a minority religion in Spain and guaranteed that “Muslim students … receive Islamic religious education in public schools.”

(Also on November 10, 1992, the Spanish government approved the “Cooperation Agreement between the Government of Spain and the Federation of Evangelical Christian Entities in Spain.” That agreement was codified in Law 24/1992. In June 1993, the Spanish government published guidelines for the teaching of evangelical Christianity in public schools.)

In recent years, Muslim leaders in Spain have complained that the Spanish government has failed to implement the 1992 agreement. According to the CIE, 90% of Muslims students in Spain lack access to Islamic studies in public schools. The new guidelines appear to signal the current government’s commitment to follow through on the promises of past governments.

The guidelines were drafted by CIE president Riaÿ Tatary, a Syrian who has lived in Spain for more than 45 years. Tatary, a medical doctor who is also the imam of the Abu-Bakr Mosque, the second-largest mosque in Madrid, is often portrayed as the epitome of Muslim integration and moderation.

Tatary is the chief interlocutor between Spain’s Muslim community and the Spanish government and has received a civilian merit award from the Ministry of Justice for his work on Spain’s law on religious liberty.

But Spanish counterterrorism analysts (here and here) have long suspected that Tatary is closely linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, which is highly critical of Western concepts of justice and democracy. The Brotherhood’s motto is: “Allah is our objective; the Prophet is our leader; the Koran is our law; Jihad is our way; dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.”

The Spanish government’s curriculum guidelines for public school Islamic studies were drafted by Riaÿ Tatary, imam of the Abu-Bakr Mosque. Spanish counterterrorism analysts have long suspected that Tatary is closely linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Tatary denies the charges, although members of his mosque have, in fact, been tied to al-Qaeda.

Ahead of municipal elections in May 2015, Tatary admonished Muslims in Spain not to vote for any candidate who “hinders or impedes the establishment of mosques for our faithful, and cemeteries for our dead.” He also said that Muslim voters should not vote for anyone who “hinders or prevents the children of Muslim citizens from receiving Islamic religion courses in public or private schools.”

Spanish political analysts said Tatary’s attempt to enforce the Spanish Muslim vote was alarming:

“At first glance, it does not seem objectionable that a group, whatever its nature, defends the rights of its members. However, when it comes to an entity that appeals to religion to impose a massive discipline of the faithful in the political arena, we cannot but be alarmed. Especially when that religion is engaged in relentless war within itself and with the rest of the civilized world.”

It seems unlikely, however, that parents and imams will accept many of Tatary’s politically correct non-literal interpretations of the Koran, which apparently are aimed at securing the government’s approval of the guidelines. The challenge of reform-minded Muslims is to convince the majority of Muslims that the Koran and the Hadiths do not actually mean what they say.

In the end, the new guidelines may end up achieving a completely undesired objective: serving as gateway to radical Islam for tens of thousands of young Muslims in Spain.

Spain: “Pacifist” Imam Arrested on Terror Charges The New York Times once praised his moderation by Soeren Kern

  • Several months after the New York Times published its hagiography of Shashaa, he was arrested for physically assaulting his third wife, who was hospitalized with a broken nose and shoulder. “The attack was obviously very brutal,” a hospital spokesperson said at the time. “What a man does with his wife does not concern the authorities,” Shashaa said.

  • Spanish High Court Judge Eloy Velasco ordered Shashaa — who lives in a 10,000 square meter (108,000 square foot) mansion in Teulada-Moraira, a small coastal town on Spain’s Mediterranean coast, with his four wives and 18 children — to be held in prison without bail.
  • Spanish authorities are now investigating the source of Shashaa’s wealth. His mosque in Munich was shuttered in October 2015 due to financial difficulties, while the mansion he purchased in Spain in February 2015 is said to be worth more than half a million euros.
  • More than two weeks after Shashaa was arrested, the New York Times still has not reported on the fate of its poster boy for Salafist pacifism.

Spanish authorities have arrested a Muslim cleric — whom the New York Times once praised for his efforts to fight radicalization within Germany’s Islamic community — for alleged ties to the Islamic State.

Hesham Shashaa (aka Abu Adam), a 46-year-old Egyptian-Palestinian, was detained near Alicante in southeastern Spain on April 26 on charges of aiding the Islamic State, extolling terrorism and promoting Salafi-jihadism.

The Spanish Interior Ministry said that Shashaa had facilitated the travel to Spain of Islamic State jihadists from Syria and Iraq by providing them with money, refuge and fake documents.

Most recently, Shashaa had made arrangements for two jihadists — who are the subjects of international arrest warrants for their membership of the Islamic State — to travel from Turkey to Spain by providing them with false passports.

In addition, Shashaa fraudulently tried to obtain for two jihadists letters of invitation with the aim of facilitating their travel from Egypt to Spain.

According to the Spanish Interior Ministry, Shashaa has also been charged with disseminating Islamic State propaganda:

“The detainee took advantage of his privileged position within the Islamic Community of the province of Alicante to spread content extolling attacks committed by the terrorist organization Islamic State and cruelly disparaging their victims. In addition, he used social networks as a tool to generate hate by publishing videos in which terrorist leaders indoctrinate their followers to engage in violent jihad.”

Jijona, in Alicante Province, Spain. (Image source: Getty Images)

On April 29, Spanish High Court Judge Eloy Velasco ordered Shashaa — who lives in a 10,000 square meter (108,000 square foot) mansion in Teulada-Moraira, a small coastal town on Spain’s Mediterranean coast, with his four wives and 18 children — to be held in prison without bail. Velasco ruled that Shashaa was a flight risk and that there was a danger he would repeat his criminal behavior (reiteración delictiva).

Shashaa settled in Spain in 2012, shortly after the New York Times published a glowing profile of his moderation while he was an imam at the Darul Quran mosque in Munich, Germany. The story, entitled “Munich Imam Strives to Dilute the Elixir of Radical Islam,” stated:

“A growing number of imams in Europe and the Middle East have denounced suicide missions and terrorist acts. Many of these imams, however, still view Al-Qaeda, the Taliban or Hamas as legitimate resistance movements, while Mr. Shashaa openly declares that they are violating the tenets of Islam.

“He travels to mosques and madrasas throughout Europe, as well as the Middle East and Pakistan, telling young Muslims that fighting against American troops and other forces is a violation of their religion. He condemns militant recruiters in his sermons, urges worshipers at Friday Prayer to call the police if they hear about plans for an attack and readily talks with law enforcement officials about the reasons for radicalization and the best way to combat it.”

In an interview with the Times, Shashaa portrayed himself as a pacifist:

“They [the militants] use the religion for their personal aims and declare war on Jews and Christians, but I want people to follow what Islam really says. We cannot just sit down and let other people hijack our religion.”

The Times also quoted a senior German security official, who said:

“We know that he speaks and works against terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda or the Taliban, and that is important. He is the only example of someone who is doing it in this way here in Germany, and in this sense he is effective.”

Shashaa told the Times that he ended up in Germany after he lost his briefcase there on a 2000 stopover while on his way to Britain from Romania, where he had been living. “Everything was gone, the papers, the money,” he said. “So I thought it was God’s will that I should stay here.”

Several months after the New York Times published its hagiography of Shashaa, he was arrested for physically assaulting his third wife, who was hospitalized with a broken nose and shoulder. “The attack was obviously very brutal,” a hospital spokesperson said at the time.

The woman, a Syrian, told police that she had wanted to live a more Western lifestyle; she wanted to find a job and stop wearing the hijab. Shashaa refused. After the woman called police, Shashaa refused to let them in. “What a man does with his wife does not concern the authorities,” he said. Shashaa was arrested and then released.

During a raid on Shashaa’s mosque in Munich, police found copies of a book — Women in the Shade of Islam — which has been banned in Germany because of its calls for violence against women. Shashaa defended his possession of the book: “I need to know what is in these books. How else will I know how to argue with recruiters?”

Spanish authorities believe Shashaa moved to Spain to evade German law enforcement, which had become increasingly suspicious of his activities. Die Zeit reported:

“In 2012, German intelligence called him a Salafist: He opposed a pluralistic society, repeatedly stated that a woman should not leave the house without her husband’s permission, and during the Gaza War in 2009 preached a sermon that disparaged Jews. He wants a theocracy, which would be inconsistent with the separation of powers, the rule of law and the parliamentary system. He posted several videos with extremist content. According to the 2012 intelligence findings, his claims to have distanced himself from extremism were deemed ‘questionable.'”

Shashaa, who does not speak Spanish, said he moved to Spain to establish a “center for cultural understanding.” Through an interpreter, Shashaa told a Spanish newspaper that “spreading culture is the best way to end prejudice and to promote tolerance.” He said that his cultural center would operate under the premise of “openness and integration” and that its doors would be “open to the whole world.” He added that the walls of the center “must be made of glass so that everyone can see how we are and what is going on in there.” Shashaa also insisted that “fundamentalism is a disease we must eradicate.”

Spanish authorities are now investigating the source of Shashaa’s wealth. His mosque in Munich was shuttered in October 2015 due to financial difficulties, while the mansion he purchased in Spain in February 2015 is said to be worth more than half a million euros.

Meanwhile, more than two weeks after Shashaa was arrested, the New York Times still has not reported on the fate of its poster boy for Salafist pacifism.

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