The Saudis are planning to establish themselves as the Arab world’s undisputed military superpower…. At this rate Saudi Arabia will soon replace Egypt as the Arab world’s most significant military power.
The Saudi royal family is determined to secure the overthrow of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, one of Iran’s most important regional allies, and any attempt by Riyadh to deepen its involvement in the Syrian conflict is likely to result in direct military confrontation with Iran.
The tragedy of all this for the Obama administration is that, had it not been for its obsession with doing a deal with Iran, Washington could have formed a useful strategic alliance with Riyadh to defeat common foes, such as Islamic State (ISIS,Isil) in Syria and Iraq.
President Barack Obama may have hailed his deal with Iran as an historic breakthrough, but this is not how it is being viewed in Saudi Arabia, where the kingdom has responded to Washington’s attempted rapprochement with Tehran by embarking on a massive military build up.
Saudi Arabia is Iran’s fiercest regional rival, with enmity between the two countries dating back at least to Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, and the Saudi royal family has voiced deep scepticism about the Obama administration’s foreign policy tilt towards Iran. Mr Obama will hear these views most forcefully expressed himself with King Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud, the Saudi monarch visits Washington this weekend.
In the past, the late Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, consistently spoke out against the dangers of a U.S.-Iran deal, while other senior Saudi security officials have warned that the kingdom would strike out on its own if its interests were threatened by an unsatisfactory nuclear agreement. The most public demonstration of the Saudis’ displeasure came in May when King Salman declined to attend a Camp David summit at which Mr. Obama hoped to reassure Gulf leaders that the Iran protected their interests.
So no one should be surprised that, now that Mr. Obama has signed off his deal with the ayatollahs, the Saudis have embarked on a massive arms build up, one that promises dramatic changes to the military balance of power in the region.
Institutional concerns in Riyadh’s defense establishment over the threat posed by Iran have already resulted in Saudi Arabia having the world’s fourth largest defence budget.A recent study by London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank conservatively estimated Riyadh’s defence spend for 2014 at $59.6 billion, although other assessments have suggested it rose by 17 percent to $80.8 billion. Either way this places Saudi spending above that of Britain, at $57 billion and France’s £52.4 billion (nearly $80 billion).
Now the Saudis are planning to establish themselves as the Arab world’s undisputed military superpower by embarking on a $150 billion defense spending spree that will see the country’s Armed Forces double in size over the course of the next five years.
The new Saudi defense doctrine drawn up by senior military officers in Riyadh proposes a doubling in the size of the air force from its current strength of around 250 combat warplanes to 500. Increases of a similar scale are envisaged for the kingdom’s other armed forces, with the Navy set to see the size of its surface fleet more than double, as well as acquiring its first submarine fleet. Saudi Arabia also wants to acquire a range of sophisticated ballistic missile systems, air defence systems and battle tanks, while the total number of combat ready personnel will rise above the 500,000 mark.
At this rate Saudi Arabia will soon replace Egypt as the Arab world’s most significant military power.
Nor is Saudi Arabia’s huge arms build up confined to conventional weaponry. In a recent interview with the Daily Telegraph in London, Prince Mohammed bin Nawwaf bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to Britain, warned that Riyadh would not rule out acquiring nuclear weapons if Washington failed to provide proper safeguards about Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
“We hope we receive the assurances that guarantee Iran will not pursue this kind of weapon,” explained Prince Mohammed “But if this does not happen, then all options will be on the table for Saudi Arabia.” Nawaf Obaid, a Saudi defence expert and visiting fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, said: “Saudi Arabia is preparing itself in case Iran develops nuclear weapons.”
Saudi Arabia is known to have close links with Pakistan, where Dr A.Q. Khan, the “father” of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal, is believed to have received Saudi funding for his research into building an atom bomb. Senior U.S. officials have warned Saudi Arabia has recently taken a “strategic decision” to acquire “off-the-shelf” nuclear weapons from Pakistan.
Saudi Arabia’s new arms build-up is being undertaken as a direct response to what many Saudis believe is the Obama administration’s capitulation to Tehran over its nuclear program. The defense doctrine identifies a nuclear-armed Iran as one of the three main threats the kingdom is likely to face in the future, together with terrorism and regional instability.
The new doctrine threatens to change dramatically the military balance of power in the Arab world, a change that is likely to be viewed with deep concern by Israel. Shortly before Mr. Obama announced the nuclear deal with Tehran the Saudis announced they had concluded a $12 billion arms deal with France, including helicopters and naval patrol vessels.
Saudi Arabia’s new policy of military assertiveness was recently demonstrated in the Yemen conflict, where the Saudi military played a decisive role in recapturing the strategically important port of Aden after it was overrun by Iranian-back Houthi rebels. As a result exiled Yemeni Prime Minister Khaled Balah has been able to return to his home country.
After their success in Yemen, the Saudis now intend to focus on Syria, where they are again likely to find themselves in direct conflict with Iranian-backed forces. The Saudi royal family is determined to secure the overthrow of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, one of Iran’s most important regional allies, and any attempt by Riyadh to deepen its involvement in the Syrian conflict is likely to result in direct military confrontation with Iran.
The tragedy of all this for the Obama administration is that, had it not been for its obsession with doing a deal with Iran, Washington could have formed a useful strategic alliance with Riyadh to defeat common foes, such as Islamic State (ISIS, Isil) in Syria and Iraq.
But after the Iran deal, the Saudis now appear determined to go it alone, which means they are likely to pursue aggressive policies in the region that will not necessarily be to Washington’s liking, and over which the Obama administration will be able to exercise precious little influence.
Con Coughlin is Defense Editor of London’s Daily Telegraph and author of “Khomeini’s Ghost: Iran since 1979” (Macmillan)​

Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed’s vision for Saudi Arabia, the way he puts it, is as a country no longer dependent on oil; with a growing economy and transparent laws, which will consequently give it a strong position in the world.
The prince has already received negative blowback from conservative members of the Al Saud clan. They have been resistant to change in the past and may not appreciate new reforms which might threaten their authority in the country.
The status quo is that Saudis are raised with the conviction that the state will always provide for their needs, healthcare and security, in exchange for their loyalty to the ruling Al Saud clan. However, the recent oil crisis has witnessed many luxuries stripped away from the Saudi people, as the state prepared to deal with a growing budget deficit. The move to impose taxes, a concept alien to the country, is sure to create discontent among ordinary Saudi people.
Saudi Arabia, long associated with oil wealth and extravagance, has decided that time has come for it to revamp its image. Last year, King Salman, 80, ascended the Saudi throne, and since then has unleashed major reforms, introduced a more assertive domestic and foreign policy, and handed over the reins of some of the most significant posts of the Saudi leadership to a younger group of Saudi leaders.
The driving force behind these reforms is the 30-year-old deputy crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, otherwise known as MBS. Prince Mohammed’s vision for Saudi Arabia, the way he puts it, is as a country no longer dependent on oil; with a growing economy and transparent laws, which will consequently give it a strong position in the world. All of this may come across as appealing, but the ability of Prince Mohammed to deliver these reforms depends on several variables. To succeed, Prince Mohammed, although he enjoys a broad mandate, still needs the support of the rest of the country.

Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Salman meets with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on May 7, 2015. (Image source: U.S. State Department)
Mohammed’s economic vision for Saudi Arabia, more commonly referred to in Saudi Arabia as “Vision 2030,” essentially intends to introduce major policy and economic reforms by turning its focus towards investments; creating more jobs; privatization; increased exports and creating a sustainable business environment.
Coming amid the oil price crunch in the region, Vision 2030 aims to move away from a dependence on oil and increasing private sector contribution towards the GDP from a current 40% to 65% by 2030, by investing more in sectors such as tourism, healthcare, education and manufacturing; increasing women’s participation in the workforce; reducing the youth unemployment rate, and privatizing major industries, such as the state owned oil company, Aramco.
The Saudi leadership apparently now wishes to turn Aramco into a conglomerate and sell 5% of its share in 2017 simultaneously in the London, Hong Kong and New York stock exchanges. The kingdom has also announced plans to cut subsidies on basic commodities such as water and electricity, in addition to introducing sales and transportation taxes.
As a part of these reforms, King Salman has also reshuffled various ministries, announced new ministers and ousted older ministers. A recent, much talked-about change has been the dismissal as Oil Minister of Ali Al-Naimi, whose name is synonymous with the Saudi oil economy, and who drove the country’s oil policy for the last two decades. He was replaced by the head of Aramco, Khalid Al Falih, who happens to be a close ally of the Crown Prince and relatively new to oil diplomacy.
These reforms are a clear indication that the Saudi government is coming to terms with the reality that, although oil revenues have been a great source of wealth, they have restricted Saudi economic growth and development in other sectors, while turning the country state into a rentier state — a condition that induced systemic and institutional problems in the country, such as lack of transparency, ingrained bureaucracy and growing corruption.
Is it possible, however, for Saudi Arabia, which derives 80% of its revenue from oil income, to break the dependence on oil?
The Saudi manufacturing sector has remained relatively small, with demand driven by limited domestic needs. Furthermore, the lack of an established prominent Saudi industry or alternative manufactured products that could appeal to foreign markets only makes it harder to consider venturing into other manufacturing.
Despite all the developments promised by Prince Mohammed, one question that lingers is the possibility of any of these reforms actually seeing the light of the day. Their success depends on support from Saudi society, which has heretofore provided strong allegiance to the leadership — royals, elites, the Wahhabi religious sect — and most importantly, the Saudi youth. Vision 2030 may call for comprehensive economic reforms, but might be perceived as insensitively turning a blind eye to the political, social, cultural and legal traditions with which it would be tampering. Prince Mohammed has already received negative blowback from conservative members of the Al Saud clan. They have been resistant to change in the past and may not appreciate new reforms which might threaten their authority in the country.
Another concern is how these reforms would be received by the ordinary Saudis. The status quo is that Saudis are raised with the conviction that the state will always provide for their needs, healthcare and security, in exchange for their loyalty to the ruling Al Saud clan. However, the recent oil crisis has witnessed many luxuries stripped away from the Saudi people, as the state prepared to deal with a growing budget deficit. The move to impose taxes, a concept alien to the country, is sure to create discontent among ordinary Saudi people. It is still unclear how reforms might affect and perhaps reinvent the social contract in the country.
Reforms to diversify the economy while an environment for growth, development and transparency, are much needed. Yet, while Prince Mohammed’s vision seems ambitious, it seems to lack concrete plans to achieve that vision. It may require years for change on the social, economic, cultural and political fronts. Until then, new reforms will be pitted against age-old partnerships, as Saudi Arabia rebuilds itself from scratch.
Sabah Khadri, a specialist in international economics, is based in Doha, Qatar.

Prior to Saudi Arabia’s attempts to spread Salafism across the Muslim world, Indonesia did not have terrorist organizations such as Hamas Indonesia, Laskar Jihad, Hizbut Tahrir, Islamic Defenders Front and Jemmah Islamiyah, to name just a few. Today, it is rife with these groups.
A mere three weeks after the Saudi king wrapped up his trip, at least 15,000 hard-line Islamist protesters took to the streets of Jakarta after Friday prayers, calling for the imprisonment of the capital city’s Christian governor, who is on trial for “blaspheming the Quran.”
In a separate crisis, crowds were demanding that Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (known familiarly as Ashok) be jailed for telling a group of fishermen that, as they are fed lies about how the Quran forbids Muslims from being governed by a kafir (infidel), he could understand why some of them might not have voted for him. If convicted, Ashok stands to serve up to five years in prison.
Accompanied by a 1,500-strong entourage, Saudi King Salman bin Abdul Aziz arrived in Indonesia on March 1 for a nine-day gala tour. He was welcomed warmly not only as the monarch of one of the world’s richest countries, but as the custodian of Islam’s two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina.
While appearing to be taking a holiday rather than embarking on an official state visit — the 81-year-old sovereign spent six days at a resort in Bali — the king had some serious business to attend to. In what was advertised as an effort to promote “social interaction” between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia — with His Majesty announcing a billion-dollar aid package, unlimited flights between the two countries and the allotment of 50,000 extra spots per year for Indonesian pilgrims to make the hajj to Mecca and Medina – it seems as if the real purpose of the trip was to promote and enhance Salafism, an extremist Sunni strain, in the world’s largest Muslim country, frequently hailed in the West as an example of a moderate Islamic society.

President Joko Widodo of Indonesia (foreground, left) meets with King Salman of Saudi Arabia (foreground, right), at Halim Perdanakusuma Airport in Indonesia. (Image source: Indonesian Presidential Palace)
Jakarta-based journalist Krithika Varagur, writing in The Atlantic on the second day of the king’s visit, describes Saudi efforts in Indonesia:
“Since 1980, Saudi Arabia has devoted millions of dollars to exporting its strict brand of Islam, Salafism, to historically tolerant and diverse Indonesia. It has built more than 150 mosques (albeit in a country that has about 800,000), a huge free university in Jakarta, and several Arabic language institutes; supplied more than 100 boarding schools with books and teachers (albeit in a country estimated to have between 13,000 and 30,000 boarding schools); brought in preachers and teachers; and disbursed thousands of scholarships for graduate study in Saudi Arabia.”
This Saudi influence has taken a serious toll on Indonesia, 90% of whose 250 million people are Sunnis. Despite its pluralistic constitution, which says, “The state guarantees each and every citizen the freedom of religion and of worship in accordance with his religion and belief,” Indonesia — which declared independence in 1945 — has grown increasingly intolerant towards Christians, Hindus and Shiite Muslims.
Prior to Saudi Arabia’s attempts to spread Salafism across the Muslim world, Indonesia did not have terrorist organizations such as Hamas Indonesia, Laskar Jihad, Hizbut Tahrir, Islamic Defenders Front and Jemmah Islamiyah, to name just a few.
Today, it is rife with these groups, which adhere strictly to Islamic sharia law, Saudi Arabia’s binding legal system, and which promote it in educational institutions. Like al-Qaeda and ISIS, they deny women equal rights, believe in death by stoning for adulterers and hand amputation for thieves, and in executing homosexuals and “apostate” Muslims.
The most recent example of the way in which this extremism has swept Indonesia took place a mere three weeks after the Saudi king wrapped up his trip. On March 31, at least 15,000 hard-line Islamist protesters took to the streets of Jakarta after Friday prayers, calling for the imprisonment of the capital city’s Christian governor, who is on trial for “blaspheming the Quran.”
This paled in comparison to the crowds — numbering about 200,000 at each violent rally — which flooded the city last November, December and February. The crowds were demanding that Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (known familiarly as Ashok) be jailed for telling a group of fishermen that, as they are fed lies about how the Quran forbids Muslims from being governed by a kafir, an infidel, he could understand why some of them might not have voted for him. If convicted, Ashok stands to serve up to five years in prison.
Sadly, such a jail term is nothing, when one considers the Islamist prison that the country as a whole has become — courtesy of King Salman and his lavish “gifts.”