Ali Mohammed al-Nimr, sentenced to be crucified, was accused of participating in banned protests and firearms offenses — despite a complete lack of evidence on the latter charge, and he was denied access to lawyers. Al-Nimr is also alleged by human rights groups to have been tortured and then forced into signing a confession while in custody.
Not only are the Saudi authorities preparing to crucify someone — in 2015 — whom they tortured into making a confession; they are preparing to crucify someone who was a minor at the time of arrest.
Alas not a week goes by without Saudi Arabia demonstrating to the world why they retain their reputation as one of the world’s foremost human rights sewers.
Crucifixion is a punishment which, it would appear, is not only Sharia-compliant but also — we must assume — Geneva-compliant.
The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva is an organization that may be easy to critique, but it is very hard to satirize. Ordinarily, if you told anyone that there was a place in Switzerland where Sudan, Iran and others of the world’s worst dictatorships and human rights abusers have their views on human rights treated with respect and deference, you would assume the script was written by Monty Python. Idi Amin would make an appearance at some point to share his views on how to improve equal conditions for women in the workplace. Pol Pot would crop up in order to castigate those countries where living standards had not been sufficiently raised in accordance with global averages.
Everything that happens in Geneva is beyond satire. But last week provides a demonstration, outrageous even by the standards of the UN. For this week, it came out – thanks to the excellent organization UN Watch — that Saudi Arabia has been appointed as the head of a key UNHRC panel. This panel selects the top officials who shape international standards in human rights; it is intended to report on human rights violations around the world. The five-member group of ambassadors, which Saudi Arabia will now head, is known as the Consultative Group and has the power to select applicants to fill more than 77 positions worldwide that deal with human rights issues. It appears that the appointment of Saudi Arabia’s envoy to the UNHRC, Faisal Trad, was made before the summer, but that diplomats in Geneva have kept silent on the matter since then.
That this appointment had to leak out months after the event raises the possibility that the UNHRC, contrary to popular perception, actually does have some sense of shame. Otherwise, why not shout from the rooftops that Saudi Arabia has won this prestigious position? Why not distribute a press release? After all, Saudi Arabia — and by extension the UNHRC — have nothing to be ashamed of, do they?
Alas not a week goes by without Saudi Arabia demonstrating to the world why they retain their reputation as one of the world’s foremost human rights sewers. Saudi Arabia may have beheaded more people in the last year than ISIS, but only rarely do any of these cases get more than a flicker of international attention. Occasionally a case breaks above the waves of public opinion. One such case is that of the jailed blogger Raif Badawi, sentenced last year to 10 years in jail and 1000 lashes for “insulting Islam.” The plight of Raif Badawi, who has already been served the first 50 lashes, and is being held in prison while awaiting the rest, has garnered international attention and condemnations of Saudi Arabia. The kingdom’s response has been strongly to denounce “the media campaign around the case.”
But the glare of international opinion clearly disturbs the Saudi authorities — a fact well worth keeping in mind. And it is not as though they have nothing to hide. This week brings a case that should get at least as much attention as that of Raif Badawi.
Ali Mohammed al-Nimr was just 17 when he was arrested by the Saudi authorities in 2012, during a crackdown on anti-government protests in the Shia province of Qatif. He was accused of participating in banned protests and firearms offenses — despite a complete lack of evidence on the latter charge. Denied access to lawyers, al-Nimr is alleged by human rights groups to have been tortured and then forced into signing a confession while in custody. Campaigners say that it seems he has been targeted by authorities because of his family association with Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, the 53-year-old critic of the Saudi regime who is his uncle. The Sheikh has also been convicted and sentenced to death. After the confession and “trial,” his nephew was convicted at Saudi’s Specialized Criminal Court and sentenced to death. The trial itself failed to meet any international standards. Al-Nimr appealed against his sentence, but this week that appeal was dismissed. It now seems likely that he and his uncle will now be executed. Because charges include crimes involving the Saudi King and the state itself, it seems likely that the method of death will be crucifixion.

Imprisoned Saudi dissidents Raif Badawi (left) and Ali Mohammed al-Nimr (right).
If this were in any way to cause a flicker of concern among other participants in the UNHRC farce going on Geneva, they have at least some consolation. For in Saudi Arabia crucifixion is not what it used to be. Indeed, in Saudi Arabia crucifixion begins with the beheading of the victim and only then the mounting of the beheaded body onto a crucifix, to make it available for public viewing. This is a punishment which it would appear is not only Sharia-compliant but also — we must assume — Geneva-compliant.
Of course, Ali Mohammed al-Nimr counts as having been a juvenile at the time of his arrest, so not only are the Saudi authorities preparing to crucify someone — in 2015 — whom they tortured into making a confession – they are preparing to crucify someone who was a minor at the time of arrest. Perhaps the authorities at the UNHRC in Geneva do indeed blush when they appoint Saudi officials to head their human rights panels. But it does not seem to affect their behaviour. Just as Saudi authorities think it is “international attention” rather than flogging people to death or crucifying them after beheading that is the problem, so the UNHRC in Geneva seems to think it is public awareness of their grotesque appointments rather than the appointments themselves that are the problem.
The international attention paid to the case of Raif Badawi has not yet seen him released, but it seems to have delayed the next rounds of lashes. Which suggests the Saudi authorities have the capacity to feel some shame. This should in turn be a cause for some hope among everyone who cares about human rights. It should also provide a reminder to everyone to increase global attention on the case of Ali Mohammed al-Nimr and the many others like him who suffer under a government and judicial system that should utterly shame the world outside Geneva, even if it cannot shame the UN.

The Saudis are planning to establish themselves as the Arab world’s undisputed military superpower…. At this rate Saudi Arabia will soon replace Egypt as the Arab world’s most significant military power.
The Saudi royal family is determined to secure the overthrow of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, one of Iran’s most important regional allies, and any attempt by Riyadh to deepen its involvement in the Syrian conflict is likely to result in direct military confrontation with Iran.
The tragedy of all this for the Obama administration is that, had it not been for its obsession with doing a deal with Iran, Washington could have formed a useful strategic alliance with Riyadh to defeat common foes, such as Islamic State (ISIS,Isil) in Syria and Iraq.
President Barack Obama may have hailed his deal with Iran as an historic breakthrough, but this is not how it is being viewed in Saudi Arabia, where the kingdom has responded to Washington’s attempted rapprochement with Tehran by embarking on a massive military build up.
Saudi Arabia is Iran’s fiercest regional rival, with enmity between the two countries dating back at least to Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, and the Saudi royal family has voiced deep scepticism about the Obama administration’s foreign policy tilt towards Iran. Mr Obama will hear these views most forcefully expressed himself with King Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud, the Saudi monarch visits Washington this weekend.
In the past, the late Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, consistently spoke out against the dangers of a U.S.-Iran deal, while other senior Saudi security officials have warned that the kingdom would strike out on its own if its interests were threatened by an unsatisfactory nuclear agreement. The most public demonstration of the Saudis’ displeasure came in May when King Salman declined to attend a Camp David summit at which Mr. Obama hoped to reassure Gulf leaders that the Iran protected their interests.
So no one should be surprised that, now that Mr. Obama has signed off his deal with the ayatollahs, the Saudis have embarked on a massive arms build up, one that promises dramatic changes to the military balance of power in the region.
Institutional concerns in Riyadh’s defense establishment over the threat posed by Iran have already resulted in Saudi Arabia having the world’s fourth largest defence budget.A recent study by London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank conservatively estimated Riyadh’s defence spend for 2014 at $59.6 billion, although other assessments have suggested it rose by 17 percent to $80.8 billion. Either way this places Saudi spending above that of Britain, at $57 billion and France’s £52.4 billion (nearly $80 billion).
Now the Saudis are planning to establish themselves as the Arab world’s undisputed military superpower by embarking on a $150 billion defense spending spree that will see the country’s Armed Forces double in size over the course of the next five years.
The new Saudi defense doctrine drawn up by senior military officers in Riyadh proposes a doubling in the size of the air force from its current strength of around 250 combat warplanes to 500. Increases of a similar scale are envisaged for the kingdom’s other armed forces, with the Navy set to see the size of its surface fleet more than double, as well as acquiring its first submarine fleet. Saudi Arabia also wants to acquire a range of sophisticated ballistic missile systems, air defence systems and battle tanks, while the total number of combat ready personnel will rise above the 500,000 mark.
At this rate Saudi Arabia will soon replace Egypt as the Arab world’s most significant military power.
Nor is Saudi Arabia’s huge arms build up confined to conventional weaponry. In a recent interview with the Daily Telegraph in London, Prince Mohammed bin Nawwaf bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to Britain, warned that Riyadh would not rule out acquiring nuclear weapons if Washington failed to provide proper safeguards about Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
“We hope we receive the assurances that guarantee Iran will not pursue this kind of weapon,” explained Prince Mohammed “But if this does not happen, then all options will be on the table for Saudi Arabia.” Nawaf Obaid, a Saudi defence expert and visiting fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, said: “Saudi Arabia is preparing itself in case Iran develops nuclear weapons.”
Saudi Arabia is known to have close links with Pakistan, where Dr A.Q. Khan, the “father” of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal, is believed to have received Saudi funding for his research into building an atom bomb. Senior U.S. officials have warned Saudi Arabia has recently taken a “strategic decision” to acquire “off-the-shelf” nuclear weapons from Pakistan.
Saudi Arabia’s new arms build-up is being undertaken as a direct response to what many Saudis believe is the Obama administration’s capitulation to Tehran over its nuclear program. The defense doctrine identifies a nuclear-armed Iran as one of the three main threats the kingdom is likely to face in the future, together with terrorism and regional instability.
The new doctrine threatens to change dramatically the military balance of power in the Arab world, a change that is likely to be viewed with deep concern by Israel. Shortly before Mr. Obama announced the nuclear deal with Tehran the Saudis announced they had concluded a $12 billion arms deal with France, including helicopters and naval patrol vessels.
Saudi Arabia’s new policy of military assertiveness was recently demonstrated in the Yemen conflict, where the Saudi military played a decisive role in recapturing the strategically important port of Aden after it was overrun by Iranian-back Houthi rebels. As a result exiled Yemeni Prime Minister Khaled Balah has been able to return to his home country.
After their success in Yemen, the Saudis now intend to focus on Syria, where they are again likely to find themselves in direct conflict with Iranian-backed forces. The Saudi royal family is determined to secure the overthrow of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, one of Iran’s most important regional allies, and any attempt by Riyadh to deepen its involvement in the Syrian conflict is likely to result in direct military confrontation with Iran.
The tragedy of all this for the Obama administration is that, had it not been for its obsession with doing a deal with Iran, Washington could have formed a useful strategic alliance with Riyadh to defeat common foes, such as Islamic State (ISIS, Isil) in Syria and Iraq.
But after the Iran deal, the Saudis now appear determined to go it alone, which means they are likely to pursue aggressive policies in the region that will not necessarily be to Washington’s liking, and over which the Obama administration will be able to exercise precious little influence.
Con Coughlin is Defense Editor of London’s Daily Telegraph and author of “Khomeini’s Ghost: Iran since 1979” (Macmillan)​

Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed’s vision for Saudi Arabia, the way he puts it, is as a country no longer dependent on oil; with a growing economy and transparent laws, which will consequently give it a strong position in the world.
The prince has already received negative blowback from conservative members of the Al Saud clan. They have been resistant to change in the past and may not appreciate new reforms which might threaten their authority in the country.
The status quo is that Saudis are raised with the conviction that the state will always provide for their needs, healthcare and security, in exchange for their loyalty to the ruling Al Saud clan. However, the recent oil crisis has witnessed many luxuries stripped away from the Saudi people, as the state prepared to deal with a growing budget deficit. The move to impose taxes, a concept alien to the country, is sure to create discontent among ordinary Saudi people.
Saudi Arabia, long associated with oil wealth and extravagance, has decided that time has come for it to revamp its image. Last year, King Salman, 80, ascended the Saudi throne, and since then has unleashed major reforms, introduced a more assertive domestic and foreign policy, and handed over the reins of some of the most significant posts of the Saudi leadership to a younger group of Saudi leaders.
The driving force behind these reforms is the 30-year-old deputy crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, otherwise known as MBS. Prince Mohammed’s vision for Saudi Arabia, the way he puts it, is as a country no longer dependent on oil; with a growing economy and transparent laws, which will consequently give it a strong position in the world. All of this may come across as appealing, but the ability of Prince Mohammed to deliver these reforms depends on several variables. To succeed, Prince Mohammed, although he enjoys a broad mandate, still needs the support of the rest of the country.

Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Salman meets with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on May 7, 2015. (Image source: U.S. State Department)
Mohammed’s economic vision for Saudi Arabia, more commonly referred to in Saudi Arabia as “Vision 2030,” essentially intends to introduce major policy and economic reforms by turning its focus towards investments; creating more jobs; privatization; increased exports and creating a sustainable business environment.
Coming amid the oil price crunch in the region, Vision 2030 aims to move away from a dependence on oil and increasing private sector contribution towards the GDP from a current 40% to 65% by 2030, by investing more in sectors such as tourism, healthcare, education and manufacturing; increasing women’s participation in the workforce; reducing the youth unemployment rate, and privatizing major industries, such as the state owned oil company, Aramco.
The Saudi leadership apparently now wishes to turn Aramco into a conglomerate and sell 5% of its share in 2017 simultaneously in the London, Hong Kong and New York stock exchanges. The kingdom has also announced plans to cut subsidies on basic commodities such as water and electricity, in addition to introducing sales and transportation taxes.
As a part of these reforms, King Salman has also reshuffled various ministries, announced new ministers and ousted older ministers. A recent, much talked-about change has been the dismissal as Oil Minister of Ali Al-Naimi, whose name is synonymous with the Saudi oil economy, and who drove the country’s oil policy for the last two decades. He was replaced by the head of Aramco, Khalid Al Falih, who happens to be a close ally of the Crown Prince and relatively new to oil diplomacy.
These reforms are a clear indication that the Saudi government is coming to terms with the reality that, although oil revenues have been a great source of wealth, they have restricted Saudi economic growth and development in other sectors, while turning the country state into a rentier state — a condition that induced systemic and institutional problems in the country, such as lack of transparency, ingrained bureaucracy and growing corruption.
Is it possible, however, for Saudi Arabia, which derives 80% of its revenue from oil income, to break the dependence on oil?
The Saudi manufacturing sector has remained relatively small, with demand driven by limited domestic needs. Furthermore, the lack of an established prominent Saudi industry or alternative manufactured products that could appeal to foreign markets only makes it harder to consider venturing into other manufacturing.
Despite all the developments promised by Prince Mohammed, one question that lingers is the possibility of any of these reforms actually seeing the light of the day. Their success depends on support from Saudi society, which has heretofore provided strong allegiance to the leadership — royals, elites, the Wahhabi religious sect — and most importantly, the Saudi youth. Vision 2030 may call for comprehensive economic reforms, but might be perceived as insensitively turning a blind eye to the political, social, cultural and legal traditions with which it would be tampering. Prince Mohammed has already received negative blowback from conservative members of the Al Saud clan. They have been resistant to change in the past and may not appreciate new reforms which might threaten their authority in the country.
Another concern is how these reforms would be received by the ordinary Saudis. The status quo is that Saudis are raised with the conviction that the state will always provide for their needs, healthcare and security, in exchange for their loyalty to the ruling Al Saud clan. However, the recent oil crisis has witnessed many luxuries stripped away from the Saudi people, as the state prepared to deal with a growing budget deficit. The move to impose taxes, a concept alien to the country, is sure to create discontent among ordinary Saudi people. It is still unclear how reforms might affect and perhaps reinvent the social contract in the country.
Reforms to diversify the economy while an environment for growth, development and transparency, are much needed. Yet, while Prince Mohammed’s vision seems ambitious, it seems to lack concrete plans to achieve that vision. It may require years for change on the social, economic, cultural and political fronts. Until then, new reforms will be pitted against age-old partnerships, as Saudi Arabia rebuilds itself from scratch.
Sabah Khadri, a specialist in international economics, is based in Doha, Qatar.